Redistricting Litigation and the Delegation of Democratic Design by Manheim, Lisa Marshall
University of Washington School of Law
UW Law Digital Commons
Articles Faculty Publications
2013
Redistricting Litigation and the Delegation of
Democratic Design
Lisa Marshall Manheim
University of Washington School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisa Marshall Manheim, Redistricting Litigation and the Delegation of Democratic Design, 93 Boston U. L. Rev. 563 (2013),
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/183
 563 
REDISTRICTING LITIGATION AND THE DELEGATION 
OF DEMOCRATIC DESIGN 
LISA MARSHALL MANHEIM

 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 564 
 I. INTRODUCING THE REDISTRICTING LITIGANTS ................................... 569 
A. Who the Redistricting Litigants Are ............................................ 570 
B. What the Redistricting Litigants Do ............................................ 575 
1. The Primary Tier of Redistricting Agents ............................. 575 
2. The Fallback Tier of Redistricting Agents ............................ 576 
a. Courts as Fallback Redistricting Agents ........................ 578 
b. Litigants as Fallback Redistricting Agents ..................... 581 
C. Where Redistricting Litigants Fit into the Current 
Conception of the Redistricting Process...................................... 582 
D. Why Understanding the Role of Litigants Matters ...................... 584 
 II. THE POWER DELEGATED TO THESE LITIGANTS AND THE CURIOUS 
REGIME THAT RESULTS ....................................................................... 585 
A. A Curious Form of Litigation ...................................................... 586 
1. The Warm Embrace of Litigants ........................................... 586 
a. Standing .......................................................................... 587 
b. Forum Selection .............................................................. 588 
c. Claim Selection ............................................................... 596 
2. The Neglect of an Unrepresented Class ................................ 599 
3. Election Exigencies and Procedural Oddities ........................ 603 
B. A Curious Form of Redistricting ................................................. 609 
 III. A TROUBLING DELEGATION ................................................................ 611 
 
 Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. I am deeply 
indebted to the many individuals who have offered insights in furtherance of this project, 
including Zachary Bray, Justin Driver, Robert Ellickson, Heather Gerken, Brianne Gorod, 
Richard Hasen, Sanne Knudsen, Justin Levitt, Clark Lombardi, David Marcus, Shannon 
Weeks McCormack, Elizabeth Porter, Judith Resnik, Zahr Said, Kathryn Watts, Michael 
Wishnie, and David Ziff. Grateful acknowledgement is likewise due to the University of 
Washington School of Law for its support, to the research librarians at the Gallagher Law 
Library for outstanding research assistance, and to the editors of the Boston University Law 
Review for their many helpful contributions. 
In the interest of disclosure, I note that I helped to advise the following parties in certain 
stages of litigation addressed in this Article: the Rodriguez plaintiffs in Perry v. Perez, 132 
S. Ct. 934 (2012); the Guy plaintiffs in Guy v. Miller, 11-OC-00042-1B (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 
27, 2011); and the Martin plaintiffs in Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. Spec. 
Redistricting Panel 2012). All opinions expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of others. 
 564 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:563 
 
A. The Normative Implications of Litigant Participation ................ 611 
B. Toward a More Thoughtful Delegation of Democratic 
Design .......................................................................................... 614 
1. Reducing Reliance on Litigants ............................................. 614 
2. Regulating Litigant Participation........................................... 616 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 620 
 
The power to redraw electoral lines is the power to design elections. 
Enormous significance therefore attaches to any delegation of redistricting 
authority. Yet in every jurisdiction in the country, the power to redistrict has 
been delegated to a varied collection of actors whose participation largely has 
escaped academic attention. They are as ubiquitous as they are overlooked: they 
are the redistricting litigants. These actors’ participation in the process leads to 
a startling form of redistricting. Though the majority of these litigants are not 
elected, appointed, or in any way vetted by the electorate at large, they are 
empowered to affect electoral lines in deliberate and politically consequential 
ways; to affect the rights of non-parties without providing class-action 
protections or other defenses; and to exploit a procedural regime that, due to the 
time pressures of the election cycle, becomes warped in ways that give litigants 
significant leverage to advance their own agendas. These features reflect a 
regime developed not through deliberate design, but rather through the 
accidental effects of judicial intervention. This Article responds to the persistent 
gap in the literature by revealing the unacknowledged power of redistricting 
litigants. It identifies the concerns their participation raises with respect to the 
outcomes, efficiency, and legitimacy of the redistricting process, and it concludes 
with a discussion of targeted reforms. These reforms include institutional 
adjustments meant to reduce reliance on litigants and procedural changes meant 
to give greater voice to non-parties. 
INTRODUCTION 
Redistricting has a technical definition: the redrawing of electoral district 
boundaries. Yet scholars often describe the practice in far more colorful terms. 
Redistricting is the “bloodsport of politics,”1 an opportunity for “political 
players [to] game the system,”2 or, simply, “war.”3 These characterizations 
attempt to capture what the definition lacks, which is an acknowledgment that 
the drawing of electoral boundaries has profound political and practical 
implications. The power to redistrict is the power to affect fundamental 
democratic design, for elections are influenced, and even decided by, the shape 
 
1 T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing 
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 588 (1993). 
2 Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 
1808, 1836 (2012). 
3 Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1379, 1381 (2012) (referring to the “redistricting wars”). 
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of particular districts.4 The understandable result is intense academic scrutiny 
directed at which individuals and institutions should be empowered to 
redistrict. To this end, scholars have debated the relative merits of courts over 
legislatures,5 legislatures over commissions,6 and commissions over courts,7 
among other formulations.8 An emerging body of scholarship – a burgeoning 
“new election law institutionalism” – has advanced these debates even further.9 
 
4 See infra note 21. 
5 Compare, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 593, 643-45 (2002) (“[T]he Court should forbid ex ante the participation of self-
interested insiders [such as legislators] in the redistricting process, instead of trying to police 
redistricting outcomes ex post.”); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 83 (2004) (“Courts should not be idealized as 
institutional guarantors against inevitable democratic pathologies, but they are the primary 
American institution capable under current circumstances of addressing the central 
structural problem of self-entrenchment.”), with Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes 
Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting 
Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 680-81 (2002) (rejecting Professor Issacharoff’s 
thesis and arguing instead that redistricting should be conducted by the “admittedly self-
interested but more accountable political bodies”). For other works exploring the choice 
between courts and legislatures, see, for example, Michael A. Carvin & Louis K. Fisher, A 
“Legislative Task”: Why Four Types of Redistricting Challenges Are Not, or Should Not Be, 
Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION L.J. 2, 42-43 (2005), and Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. 
Karlan, Where to Draw the Line: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 541, 578 (2004). 
6 Compare, e.g., Persily, supra note 5, at 678-79 (“[A]ssuming that we could find a 
philosopher king whom we could trust both to develop and to apply neutral redistricting 
principles, we should still hesitate to embrace such a method for determining the building 
blocks of legislative representation. . . . Through redistricting, legislatures not only make the 
tough value-laden decisions as to how communities should be represented, but they create 
service relationships between representatives and constituents that fit into larger public 
policy programs.”), with Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 644 (“Various approaches to 
nonpartisan redistricting, such as blue-ribbon commissions, panels of retired judges, and 
Iowa’s computer-based models, recommend themselves as viable alternatives to the pro-
incumbent status quo.”). See generally Heather K. Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of 
Independence: Inoculating Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 
ELECTION L.J. 184, 184 (2007). 
7 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 
1611 (1999). 
8 See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOYOLA L.A. 
L. REV. 513, 522-42 (2011) (analyzing alternatives to incumbent control of the redistricting 
process); see also JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
REDISTRICTING 23 (2010) [hereinafter LEVITT, CITIZEN’S GUIDE], available at http://brennan. 
3cdn.net/cdefaa72f3179649cb_pqm6b404v.pdf (describing proposals in which “computers 
draw the lines using automated algorithms,” or “members of the public [submit] plans to be 
judged purely on quantitative criteria”). 
9 See Cain, supra note 2, at 1843. 
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These discussions are of tremendous value. But they are incomplete. Despite 
their foundation in institutional competence and design, they fail to take into 
adequate account – and often fail even to acknowledge – the pivotal role 
played each redistricting cycle by a separate set of agents: the redistricting 
litigants.10 Members of this group are empowered, in every jurisdiction across 
the country, to affect electoral lines in ways that are legally sanctioned and 
politically consequential. Yet their participation attracts almost no sustained 
scholarly attention. 
A more careful look at litigants’ influence over redistricting confirms the 
timeliness and importance of exploring the implications of this phenomenon. As 
of the date that members of the 113th Congress – including many elected 
pursuant to the most recent round of redistricting – were sworn in, nearly 200 
redistricting-related cases had been filed following the 2010 Census.11 This 
litigation already had had an enormous effect on democratic design across the 
country, as courts in over a dozen states had rejected plans that were designed, 
whether recently or in a prior redistricting cycle, by state legislatures or 
redistricting commissions, and within that set, over half had redrawn the 
district lines themselves.12 And the effect was far from finished: some sixty 
cases still remained active.13 
A more careful look at how litigants have driven and otherwise affected this 
process reveals a host of questions and concerns. Although redistricting 
litigants benefit from a significant delegation of redistricting authority, most of 
these actors are never elected, appointed, or in any way vetted by the electorate 
at large. Their participation in redistricting is transparent only in the most 
nominal sense. Litigants nevertheless enjoy a privileged position in the 
redistricting process, one that accords them a procedural regime 
accommodating of their preferences, even when that accommodation affects 
redistricting outcomes; an ability to affect the rights of non-parties without 
providing protections that would be required in a class-action setting; and an 
unusual jumble of timing-based rules that gives redistricting litigants significant 
leverage to advance their own agendas. The consequences of such participation 
are far-reaching, as nearly all redistricting-related reforms implicitly rely on 
litigants for implementation or enforcement, and reliance on these actors may 
compromise the very purpose of such efforts. Litigant participation also raises 
difficult questions of legitimacy, questions that cannot be adequately 
considered, much less addressed, without critical scrutiny. 
 
10 By “agent,” this Article means to refer to “[s]omething that produces an effect,” not 
necessarily “[o]ne who is authorized to act for or in place of another.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 72 (9th ed. 2009). 
11 Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricti 
ng.lls.edu/cases.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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Despite these concerns, a gap in the literature is perhaps to be expected. 
Litigation over matters of public importance is hardly unusual, and, as a result, 
it may not be clear why redistricting litigants should warrant special attention, 
particularly when many of the features of redistricting litigation have analogs 
in other litigation contexts. Moreover, not all scholarship ignores redistricting 
litigants; some simply conflates litigants with the courts before which they 
appear. This conflation has a certain logic to it: litigants cannot affect district 
lines directly but instead must do so through judicial mediators. With election 
law scholars already analyzing the participation of courts in the redistricting 
process, perhaps there is no need to subject redistricting litigants to separate 
scrutiny. 
This Article fights against such conclusions. It seeks to reveal how the 
practice of litigating as redistricting, which has evolved into a form of 
litigation highly susceptible to procedural manipulation, has created a type of 
redistricting that grants profound power to those who choose to litigate. In so 
doing, this Article rejects any understanding of the redistricting process that 
understands the influence of litigants to be somehow negated or neutralized by 
the involvement of courts.14 It recognizes, moreover, that many of the defining 
features of redistricting litigation – which are, in certain respects, analogous to 
those characterizing other problematic forms of litigation – nevertheless reflect 
some of the most startling effects of applying the trans-substantive norm of 
civil procedure to extraordinary causes of action.15 These effects stem in part 
from what is at stake. Redistricting through litigation has far-reaching and even 
multiplied effects on the public interest, as challenges to state-imposed 
redistricting regimes affect the composition of the legislatures that enact future 
statutes. Moreover, these effects are neither rare nor random, arising at 
unpredictable times in an unpredictable fashion. Redistricting litigation instead 
occurs with clocklike regularity every redistricting cycle,16 with jurisdictions 
across the country relying on this form of litigation to ensure legality and 
simply when necessary to overcome legislative deadlock.17 In other words, the 
effects of redistricting litigation are profound – and predictably so. 
In exploring the implications of these observations, this Article initiates the 
project of subjecting litigant participation in redistricting to the scrutiny it 
warrants. Part I begins with an introduction of redistricting litigants. It 
identifies several traits that best characterize these actors, a group whose 
composition is heterogeneous, ad hoc, and largely self-selected. It situates 
 
14 Quite to the contrary, redistricting litigants exercise important control over the judicial 
actors meant to mediate their participation. See infra Part II.A.1.b-c, A.3. 
15 Cf. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal 
Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 373 (2010) (“The pressures of complexity and 
specialization, among other developments, have imperiled the trans-substantivity principle 
as a bulwark of federal civil procedure.”). 
16 See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra Part I.B.2. 
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these actors as critical participants in the redistricting process but as virtual 
non-entities in the existing literature. After identifying the stakes implicated by 
this unusual combination, Part I confirms that litigant participation will 
become no less critical to the redistricting process in the foreseeable future. 
The delegation of authority to litigants instead promises to remain as central to 
the redistricting process as it has been for now half a century.18 
Part II reveals the consequences. It demonstrates how the delegation of 
authority operates through a form of litigation subject to significant control by 
litigants. At the outset, redistricting through litigation offers a flexible and 
forgiving regime to those electing to litigate, with a standing doctrine able to 
accommodate anyone – that is, anyone of sufficient resources and adequate 
motivation – wishing to participate in the redistricting process; a venue regime 
that provides extraordinary rewards for parties trying to secure a preferred 
judge; and flexibility in claim selection that permits litigants to set the courts’ 
agendas in powerful and consequential ways. Yet at the same time redistricting 
litigation is so hospitable to litigants, it offers remarkably few protections to 
non-litigants. A striking example of aggregative litigation packaged as an 
individual lawsuit, redistricting litigation seems like the sort that should be 
subjected to class-action-style protections. But it is not. Compounding this 
neglect of non-parties is a shifting regime of legal standards that courts have 
developed in response to the exigencies of the election cycle. This unusual 
compression of civil procedure gives litigants significant control over several 
fundamental aspects of the process, including the balance of power among 
redistricting agents, the standards for relief, and the timing of court-imposed 
remedies. 
Combined, these features produce a procedural regime ripe for 
manipulation by litigants. This, in turn, produces an unexpected form of 
redistricting – one that grants sweeping power to actors who are not 
representative of the general electorate and that requires them to exercise 
power through opaque and indirect means. These features reflect a 
redistricting regime developed not through deliberate effort, but rather through 
the accidental effects of judicial intervention. It reveals a startling model of 
democratic design. 
Such a regime raises normative concerns. Part III identifies the questions 
that litigant participation raises with respect to fundamental qualities of the 
redistricting process, including its outcomes, efficiency, and legitimacy. 
These concerns urge a more thoughtful delegation of democratic design. To 
this end, the Article discusses potential reforms that may help to advance two 
general goals: improved representativeness and reduced opportunity for 
procedural manipulation by litigants. At the forefront of these proposals are 
institutional adjustments meant to reduce reliance on litigants and procedural 
changes meant to give greater voice to non-parties. These discussions, which 
 
18 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding for the first time that plaintiffs 
challenging legislative reapportionment had presented a justiciable claim). 
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come fifty years after the Supreme Court first transformed litigants into agents 
of redistricting,19 are long overdue. 
I. INTRODUCING THE REDISTRICTING LITIGANTS 
Identifying the agents of redistricting – including the litigants who play such 
a pivotal role – is critical, at the very outset, because redistricting matters, and 
it matters who redistricts. When asserted at a high level of generality, these 
broad propositions elicit little controversy. Indeed, it has become “a core 
understanding in American politics . . . that geographically districted elections 
are subject to ends-oriented manipulation.”20 Perhaps the most vivid 
illustration occurs when an election outcome is unmistakably affected by the 
shape of electoral districts,21 although often the effect is more subtle. Even 
when districts have equal populations, “[t]he choice to draw a district line one 
way, not another, always carries some consequence for politics.”22 In short, 
different maps generate different elections. And different elections have at 
least the potential to generate different politicians.23 It therefore matters how 
electoral maps are drawn – and, by extension, who is empowered to do the 
drawing. 
The identity of the map-drawers matters for at least two reasons. First, the 
task of redistricting is in no sense ministerial. Quite to the contrary, 
redistricting requires the exercise of enormous discretion, with maps generally 
susceptible to numerous variations, each with its own set of electoral 
 
19 See id. 
20 Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 595. 
21 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 466 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing how, under one district plan, if members of a given 
political party won 50% of the statewide vote, they would be likely to win twenty of thirty-
two congressional seats, whereas, under another plan, they would be likely to win only 
sixteen); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 358-59 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Given a 
fairly large state population with a fairly large congressional delegation, districts assigned so 
as to be perfectly random in respect to politics would translate a small shift in political 
sentiment, say a shift from 51% Republican to 49% Republican, into a seismic shift in the 
makeup of the legislative delegation, say from 100% Republican to 100% Democrat.”); 
Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE 
L.J. 2505, 2553-54 (1997) (“Recent cases now document in microscopic detail the 
astonishing precision with which redistricters can carve up individual precincts and 
distribute them between districts with confidence concerning the racial and partisan 
consequences.”). 
22 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
23 The shape of electoral districts can affect which politicians get elected. See supra note 
21. It has also been suggested that the shape of electoral districts can affect how politicians 
then govern. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (“When a district obviously 
is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected 
officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the 
members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole.”). 
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consequences.24 There is, as a result, almost always the potential for those in 
charge of redistricting meaningfully to affect district boundaries. Second, the 
legitimacy of the redistricting process may depend in part on who is 
empowered to draw the electoral maps.25 This legitimacy (or lack of 
legitimacy) may go so far as to affect those elected pursuant to those maps,26 in 
which case the identity of the map-drawers takes on even greater importance. 
These concerns are reflected in a voluminous literature debating the relative 
merits of empowering certain actors over others.27 Yet as discussed in more 
detail below,28 the existing scholarship has overlooked a critical group of 
participants: the thousands of individuals who have affected district maps 
through resort to litigation. The redistricting process accommodates, and even 
relies on, these litigants to ensure the timely implementation of district lines. 
While it is true that these agents cannot directly change map lines, but rather 
must act by influencing those who are so empowered, they nevertheless are 
able to exercise significant control over redistricting through efforts that are 
authorized and facilitated by the legal system itself. 
The following discussion, which introduces redistricting litigants and 
provides an overview of the redistricting process, helps to situate litigants in 
this regime and to confirm the pivotal role they play. 
A. Who the Redistricting Litigants Are 
Redistricting litigants – a term this Article uses broadly to include not only 
the parties nominally named in litigation, but also those operating (often 
behind the scenes) to control, fund, or otherwise drive redistricting litigation – 
share certain definitional commonalities.29 They all pursue the same ultimate 
 
24 See Micah Altman, The Computational Complexity of Automated Redistricting: Is 
Automation the Answer?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 81, 98 (1997) (“For even a 
small number of census tracts and districts, the number of possible districting arrangements 
is enormous.”). 
25 Legitimacy, in this context, may be understood as reflecting various meanings, 
including the public’s perceived obligation to, and support of, legal authority. See TOM R. 
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 27-28 (1990). This Article, which seeks to raise 
questions of legitimacy as they relate to the participation of litigants in the redistricting 
process, does not go so far as to answer these difficult inquiries. An excellent exploration 
and critique of the use of legitimacy-based arguments in the field of election law can be 
found in Christopher S. Elmendorf, Empirical Legitimacy and Election Law, in RACE, 
REFORM, AND REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
117 (Heather K. Gerken, Guy Uriel E. Charles & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011). 
26 See Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 605-06 (describing certain Supreme Court cases as 
“ground[ing] the legitimacy of the exercise of governmental power in the fairness and 
propriety of the electoral process itself”). 
27 See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra Part I.C. 
29 The term “redistricting litigants,” for purposes of this Article, at times encompasses a 
particularly important class of individuals exercising control over the litigation: the lawyers. 
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goal: to affect the shape of electoral districts. They all must act through a 
judicial mediator, as they lack authority to draw district lines directly. What is 
more, as this Article seeks to reveal, they all enjoy a privileged role in the 
redistricting process, for they all operate within a legal system that 
accommodates, facilitates, and even relies on their efforts when determining 
district lines.30 
Beyond these broad generalities, however, redistricting litigants can be 
difficult to describe. As a strictly formal matter, of course, litigants are quickly 
recognized; their names are a matter of public record, and they generally are 
suing in their capacity as voters in the districts they are challenging, for it is 
this quality that most reliably accords them standing.31 Beyond these 
informational tidbits, however, there is little in the public sphere that describes 
the nature of redistricting litigants or identifies their motivations. This lack of 
transparency is in part due to lax disclosure regimes. Redistricting litigants 
face no set requirement that they inform the court, much less the public, about 
the motivations or the funding behind their lawsuits. Transparency also tends 
to be undermined by the rules for getting into court. In order to secure stand-
ing, redistricting litigants normally must reside in the district they seek to 
challenge.32 While this requirement might seem to impose a significant 
limitation on which parties get to participate in redistricting litigation, it in fact 
is easily circumvented by those willing to find litigant proxies.33 In a sense, 
therefore, the standing requirements create an incentive for actors to participate 
in redistricting litigation at one degree removed, through an arrangement 
whereby voters in the relevant district serve as the nominal litigants. This two-
tiered arrangement means that the minimal information contained in the 
complaints is at best incomplete. 
Despite such challenges, one can make an educated guess about the 
composition of litigants in any given lawsuit. Usually, those most likely to be 
appearing before a judge – either directly or through a litigant proxy – are 
those with significant financial backing and the most directly at stake. This 
tends to include major political parties, prominent interest groups, and, if the 
stakes are high enough, an individual legislator or some splinter faction from a 
political party. Parsing through the litigants in select cases tends to confirm this 
intuition.34 
 
Lawyers necessarily are implicated, for example, whenever the Article discusses litigation 
strategies. While this Article generally does not differentiate among these different classes 
of “litigants” (that is, among the nominal litigants, those operating behind the scenes, and 
the lawyers who represent either or both of them), the ways in which these actors’ interests 
overlap and diverge is an underexplored topic that warrants further analysis. 
30 For an overview, see infra Part I.B. 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995). 
32 See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
34 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, The Elysian Fields of the Law, 57 
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It also is possible to classify redistricting litigants in terms that are more 
general but still revealing. To this end, the composition of this group can be 
described as heterogeneous, ad hoc, and, for the most part, self-selected. As a 
closer examination of these traits confirms, there is little reason to conclude 
that this group represents all the interests implicated by redistricting. 
At the outset, redistricting litigants as a group are heterogeneous with 
respect to their affiliations, motivations, and levels of competence. A 
redistricting plaintiff, for example, may be associated with any number of 
groups, including political parties, political factions, minority groups, or other 
interest groups. Occasionally, a plaintiff will proceed on his own behalf, as 
may be the case with respect to individual politicians or other civic-minded 
individuals. On the defense side, a redistricting litigant normally proceeds in 
his or her capacity as a state actor (frequently, as secretary of state, the official 
whom most redistricting litigants are required by law to sue).35 Even on the 
defense side, however, there is meaningful diversity: there very well may be 
outside parties – such as political parties or interest groups – driving litigation 
nominally pursued by a state actor.36 
Given the diversity of affiliations, it is perhaps not surprising that 
redistricting litigants, as a group, also are heterogeneous in their motivations. 
At the highest level of generality, redistricting litigants want to affect electoral 
lines, and they tend to be driven by discrete concerns, often relating to a certain 
politician, cause, or political party. Beyond this, however, litigants on both the 
plaintiffs’ side and the defense side tend to have complex motivations, 
sometimes seemingly at odds with the positions they take in their cases. This is 
due in part to the inherent complexity of redistricting litigation. Many of the 
legal issues, forms of proof, and predictions regarding electoral consequences 
are extraordinarily complicated. As a result, it often is necessary for litigants to 
rely not on ideological preferences or party platforms, but rather on lawyers 
and data experts to determine which legal positions to advance. Coupled with 
the intricate political dances and shifting alliances that dictate the particular 
goals litigants decide to pursue, the result is that legal positions may shift in the 
course of a single redistricting cycle; litigants affiliated with the same political 
 
STAN. L. REV. 695, 710 (2004) (“Even if the plaintiffs themselves are not political activists – 
and often they are – the lawsuits are nearly always financed and run by political parties.”). 
But see Robinson O. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina – A Personal Perspective, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 1301, 1315 (2000) (describing litigation brought by individuals not affiliated 
with established political actors). See generally STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: 
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY (2007) 
(describing political players involved in redistricting in Texas). 
35 Occasionally, the government itself even might serve as a litigant, as when the United 
States sues to enforce federal law or a state sues the federal government to receive the 
preclearance required by the Voting Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (2006). 
36 See, e.g., BICKERSTAFF, supra note 34 (describing efforts by Republican national 
politicians, including Congressman Tom DeLay, to design and defend a mid-cycle 
redistricting of the state’s congressional districts). 
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party may take opposite legal positions in different jurisdictions; and parties 
may take positions that appear contrary to type. A Republican-backed group, 
for example, might decide to join individual Democratic legislators in 
advocating for certain majority-minority districts, given the possibility of 
constructing a map that shields both the individual legislators and Republican 
incumbents.37 The legal positions taken during litigation are only loose proxies 
for a litigant’s more complicated underlying motivations. 
Finally, there is significant diversity in litigants’ levels of competence. 
Some are represented by preeminent experts in the field, lawyers and 
specialists with decades of redistricting experience. Others proceed pro se. 
There is, moreover, evidence to suggest that large amounts of money recently 
have been poured into groups funding redistricting litigation and other 
redistricting efforts.38 Yet not all litigants benefit from this funding.39 As a 
result of these discrepancies, courtroom adversaries may be mismatched in 
competence. 
The diversity among litigants should not, however, be mistaken for an 
organized attempt to ensure broad representation. That would imply a 
centralized system that does not exist. This absence goes to the second central 
trait defining redistricting litigants: the ad hoc nature of their composition. 
Beyond the requirement that certain state actors be named as defendants, there 
is virtually no regulation affecting whose interests are represented.40 The scope 
of representation instead is a result of case-by-case decisionmaking by 
potential litigants. Determinations regarding who will serve as redistricting 
litigants, in other words, are not driven in any systematic fashion; they instead 
are a reflection of decentralized decisionmaking by a disparate collection of 
individuals and organizations. Although this ad hoc approach to representation 
may be typical in certain forms of civil litigation, it deviates from the approach 
employed in other prominent forms of litigation (such as that used in class 
actions),41 it reflects a markedly lenient set of standing rules,42 and it takes on a 
particular significance in the redistricting context.43 
 
37 See, e.g., Olga Pierce et al., The Hidden Hands in Redistricting: Corporations and 
Other Powerful Interests, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2011, 8:03 AM), http://www.propublica.or 
g/article/hidden-hands-in-redistricting-corporations-special-interests. 
38 See, e.g., Cynthia Burton, Center for a Better New Jersey Funding Is a Mystery, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 15, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-02-15/news/28536244_1_a 
pportionment-commission-redrawing-district-boundaries; Pierce et al., supra note 37.  
39 See, e.g., Everett, supra note 34, at 1315 (describing financial difficulties encountered 
in litigation against a state). 
40 As discussed below, although standing doctrines exist, they have little practical effect. 
See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra Part II.A.2. 
42 See infra Part II.A.1.a. 
43 See infra Part II.B. 
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This, in turn, relates to the final central trait of redistricting litigants, which 
is that they are, for the most part, self-selected. Like most plaintiffs, 
redistricting plaintiffs choose whether to join a lawsuit, and that decision is 
entirely voluntary. In the redistricting context, this means that the conversion 
from a non-participant to an important agent of redistricting is based on a 
litigant’s own initiative, not because the law affirmatively has assigned the 
litigant this role.44 There is, as a corollary, no public selection process or 
vetting of those who choose to participate.45 There is not even any requirement 
of transparency with respect to these actors.46 While there are exceptions – 
most prominently, with respect to certain state actors, who often are required to 
participate in the process as defendants47 – the majority of redistricting litigants 
are private parties whose roles in the process are entirely voluntary and self-
directed.48 
These three traits – heterogeneity, an ad hoc approach to representation, and 
self-selection – define redistricting litigants. The result is a group of 
participants that tends to represent not the electorate at large, but rather the 
interests of established political actors, such as major political parties and 
prominent interest groups. These are the actors who have been empowered to 
take on the quintessentially public task of redistricting. 
 
44 In a very broad sense, of course, the law has assigned private litigants a role by 
granting them standing to bring suit or intervene. This observation, while valid, fails to take 
into account more subtle differences. Members of the private-litigant group have been 
assigned no special role in the redistricting process (beyond their undifferentiated status as 
voters), and they become participants in the redistricting process only if they voluntarily 
elect to be. 
45 The rare candid account by a redistricting litigant helps to illustrate this phenomenon. 
See, e.g., Everett, supra note 34, at 1305 n.23, 1310 n.51, 1311 n.54 (describing litigants in 
a prominent redistricting case as: a law professor spearheading the case on his own 
initiative; that professor’s colleague, son, and secretary; and one “public-spirited Durham 
citizen”); cf. id. at 1316 n.71 (referring to certain nominal litigants as “persons sponsored by 
the organizations involved”). 
46 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
47 See supra note 35 (noting that the government on occasion also will serve as a 
litigant). 
48 Nearly all redistricting plaintiffs are private parties (as those are the ones most likely to 
have both standing and the motivation to sue), and in most redistricting lawsuits, the 
plaintiffs greatly outnumber the defendants. In the litigation challenging district lines in 
Texas, for example, there were, at one point, over fifty named plaintiffs, nearly all suing in 
their individual capacities, and only seven named defendants, all being sued in their official 
capacities. See Order at 1, Perez v. Texas, No. 11-CA-360 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2011), 
available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxeOfQQnUr_gNWIxZmU1M2EtNDVhNS00 
ZmI1LWFmMTktZWMzNmU1YmQ4MmMy/edit?hl=en. 
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B. What the Redistricting Litigants Do 
Although there is significant variation in the claims, strategies, and 
procedural maneuvers adopted by redistricting litigants, these actors all operate 
within the same legal framework. The nature of their involvement therefore 
can be understood through a description of how the redistricting process 
unfolds. As discussed in more detail below, redistricting litigants engage in an 
important form of redistricting by participating in civil litigation, and they do 
so during a particular stage of the process: what this Article refers to as 
“fallback redistricting.” 
1. The Primary Tier of Redistricting Agents 
In every jurisdiction, redistricting can be understood as a two-step process, 
one that begins with the commencement of a “primary” form of redistricting 
and that ends once all forms of “fallback” redistricting have been exhausted. 
On the most fundamental level, what distinguishes these two forms of 
redistricting is the identity of the agent engaged in redistricting. Litigants 
represent one such agent, and their involvement in the process marks an 
indispensable form of fallback redistricting. Notwithstanding the significant 
variations among jurisdictions engaged in redistricting, this two-step 
framework, and the role of litigants within it, holds true for all. 
Identifying the primary tier of redistricting agents is relatively 
straightforward. In each jurisdiction, the law expressly empowers a certain set 
of actors to redistrict in the first instance. By definition, membership in this 
preferred set is limited to those who are empowered by law to design district 
lines that, in the absence of illegality, take precedence over all others. This 
Article refers to this group as the “primary tier” of redistricting agents, and 
their control over the process is significant.49 
Prototypical members of the primary tier of redistricting agents are state 
legislatures. These are the bodies normally empowered to enact the statutes 
that set statewide district lines.50 In a minority of jurisdictions, state law has 
replaced state legislatures with redistricting boards or commissions.51 
 
49 For congressional elections, there is an even higher tier of primary redistricting agents: 
the federal government. Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the 
authority to override any state regulations relating to congressional elections. U.S. CONST. 
art. 1, § 4. This added complexity does not change the basic framework, however, not least 
of all because Article I, Section 4 expressly relies on state legislatures to control 
redistricting in the absence of congressional action. Id. 
50 In Alabama, for example, the state constitution expressly vests the state legislature 
with authority to draw statewide electoral maps. ALA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 198-200. It is true 
that in Alabama, as in many other states, the governor retains the ability to veto redistricting 
legislation. Id. § 125. Although gubernatorial participation somewhat complicates the role of 
legislatures as primary redistricting agents, it does not alter their status. 
51 See generally LEVITT, CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 8, at 20-36. Within these 
categories, there are important distinctions. Id. In California, for example, primary 
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Regardless of the particular form the primary agent takes, however, a 
fundamental consistency remains: in each jurisdiction some set of agents 
enjoys a preferred position in the redistricting process, which means that any 
district lines they draw will govern, taking precedence over all other lines. 
This power, while significant, is subject to an important limitation. If the 
lines drawn by primary redistricting agents fail to comply with certain legal 
restrictions, then other redistricting agents become empowered to alter them.52 
These legal restrictions, which are identified in more detail below,53 are both 
statutory and constitutional, both state-based and federal. These restrictions are 
not, however, self-enforcing, and the remedies for their violation are not self-
defining. To the contrary, the task of enforcing these restrictions, and 
designing remedies for their violation, falls on a distinct set of actors. It is at 
this stage of the process that the next tier of redistricting agents wields its 
influence. 
2. The Fallback Tier of Redistricting Agents 
Primary redistricting agents do not always succeed in fulfilling their 
mandate, which is to draw legal district lines.54 When they fail, the law 
delegates to a different set of redistricting agents the ability to fill the gap – 
that is, to design lines that will govern elections.55 Members of this latter group 
serve, in a sense, as fallback redistricting agents, and this Article therefore 
refers to them as members of the “fallback tier.”56 
 
redistricting is now conducted by the fourteen commission members selected to serve on the 
state’s “Citizens Redistricting Commission.” See CAL. CONST. art. 21, §§ 1-3; see also 
Vandermost v. Bowen, 269 P.3d 446, 455-56 (Cal. 2012) (describing the commission). 
52 These alterations can occur either directly, through courts redrawing the maps 
themselves, or indirectly, through courts requiring that the primary redistricting agents make 
certain changes. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. In addition, district lines can 
be rejected or replaced through a separate mechanism in states that permits voter initiatives 
or referenda. Although redistricting through direct voter action presents interesting issues 
relating to process, outcomes, and legitimacy, the phenomenon is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
53 See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. 
54 For a discussion of this mandate, see infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
55 For a discussion of precisely what “law” empowers these agents, see infra notes 58, 60 
and accompanying text. 
56 This Article does not employ the term “fallback tier” either to imply passivity on the 
part of its members or indicate a strict separation of roles between fallback and primary 
redistricting agents. Members of the fallback tier actually may be one factor contributing to 
the failure of primary redistricting agents to draw legal district lines. (Fallback-tier agents 
might, for example, exert influence on primary-tier agents through the threat of litigation 
creating legislative gridlock.) This Article instead relies on the term “fallback tier” because 
it helps to illustrate the shifting stages that characterize redistricting in the United States. To 
this end, it should be noted that fallback redistricting is distinct from the legislative practice 
of incorporating “fallback” provisions into statutes to take effect if some original statutory 
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Precisely what “law” effects this delegation of power derives from multiple 
sources and to some extent depends on the jurisdiction. A straightforward 
illustration exists in Illinois. The state constitution initially empowers the 
legislature to draw certain districts following each decennial census conducted 
by the federal government.57 If the legislature fails to enact a plan by a given 
date, however, the constitution shifts power to a “Legislative Redistricting 
Commission.”58 In other words, the commission becomes empowered to draw 
lines when – and only when – the primary redistricting agents have failed to 
complete the redistricting task. 
While the Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission provides a clear 
illustration of a fallback redistricting agent, commissions are hardly the most 
prominent of these actors.59 Instead, the delegation of authority falls most 
commonly, and most importantly, to the courts. In every jurisdiction across the 
country, and with respect to every district map, courts are poised to serve as 
fallback redistricting agents.60 Necessarily accompanying these judicial actors 
are the litigants. It is in this capacity that litigants serve as critical – indeed, 
indispensable – fallback redistricting agents. 
Fallback redistricting as a significant phenomenon has emerged largely as a 
result of Baker v. Carr and its progeny.61 It is, in other words, largely a result 
of the Supreme Court’s justiciability holdings, which, among other things, 
introduced a new class of redistricting agents into the redistricting process. The 
full effect of these precedents is even more dramatic. Through these decisions, 
 
provision is later invalidated. See Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303. 
304 (2007). The two phenomena nevertheless share fundamental similarities. Most 
important, both respond to the threat of judicial review and invalidation by empowering a 
court or other legally designated body, acting within a certain set of legally imposed 
constraints, to respond to and remedy legal deficiencies. Viewed at a sufficiently high level 
of generality, fallback redistricting in this sense may be considered a subset of what 
Professor Dorf has termed “fallback law.” Cf. id. at 310. 
57 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b). 
58 See id. 
59 Relatively few states have regimes analogous to that of Illinois. See LEVITT, CITIZEN’S 
GUIDE, supra note 8, at 21. 
60 The law granting courts this power derives in part from state constitutions and statutes 
and in part from federal law. In Pennsylvania, for example, the state constitution expressly 
permits challenges to be brought in the state supreme court and thereby empowers the court, 
and therefore litigants, to engage in fallback redistricting. PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(d). In 
numerous jurisdictions, general grants of jurisdiction permit the same – that is, they permit 
litigants and state courts to engage in fallback redistricting through litigation and 
adjudication of redistricting lawsuits. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 3. The federal 
government also provides an important source of law empowering the fallback tier of 
redistricting actors. Most prominently, federal law – as a result of precedents such as Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its progeny – permits litigants and federal courts to 
engage in fallback redistricting through litigation and adjudication of federal redistricting 
lawsuits.  
61 Baker, 369 U.S. at 201. 
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the Supreme Court has imposed a periodic redistricting mandate that prohibits 
primary redistricting agents from avoiding the threat of fallback redistricting 
simply by refusing to act.62 More specifically, the Supreme Court’s equal 
representation jurisprudence effectively requires that district lines be redrawn 
after each delivery of federal census data,63 and any failure by a primary 
redistricting agent to comply with this affirmative mandate creates an 
opportunity and need for fallback redistricting. Fallback redistricting has 
become in this sense an integral, and routine, part of the process – and one that, 
in its current form, depends heavily on both courts and litigants. Although the 
latter’s role in the process tends to be conflated with that of the courts, these 
sets of actors, and the effects they have on the process, are distinct. 
a. Courts as Fallback Redistricting Agents 
The role of courts in redistricting is extensive. As one scholar puts it, 
“[e]very 10 years, redistricting litigation joins death and taxes as one of life’s 
certainties.”64 The landscape helps to explain why: in every jurisdiction across 
the country, some combination of state and federal courts is potentially 
empowered to alter district lines when, in response to the decennial census, 
primary agents have failed to enact a legal map into law. The Supreme Court 
has referred to this phenomenon as “judicial redistricting,”65 and it occurs with 
regularity.66 
A court alters district lines – that is, engages in fallback redistricting – 
through one of two mechanisms. The first mechanism is analogous, in a loose 
sense, to an appellate court’s remand, and it is the mechanism a court normally 
is required to employ, at least initially, in the redistricting context.67 When 
employing this mechanism, the court enjoins use of existing district lines, 
identifies the legal restrictions it concludes require such action, and then 
provides primary redistricting agents an opportunity to redraw the district lines 
in a manner consistent with those same legal restrictions.68 Although the court 
 
62 This quality differentiates fallback redistricting from more traditional forms of fallback 
law. See supra note 56. 
63 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 
1, 8 (1964); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (1993). In a number of jurisdictions, state law independently 
requires redistricting on a set timetable. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
64 Justin Levitt, Ten Lawyers Leaping: A New Year’s Redistricting Review, ALL ABOUT 
REDISTRICTING (Jan. 3, 2012), http://redistricting.lls.edu/. 
65 Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993). 
66 See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Judging 
Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 
1688-90 (1993) (“[In 1980] roughly one-third of all redistricting was done either directly by 
federal courts or under the injunctive authority of the courts.”). 
67 See, e.g., Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978). 
68 Id. 
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in this circumstance is not directly drawing district lines, it is doing so 
indirectly. The court has affected the shape of the district lines, and it has done 
so in its capacity as a fallback redistricting agent. 
The second mechanism is more direct than the first. Here, the court issues an 
order in which it has drawn the district lines itself.69 It is in this circumstance 
that court involvement in the redistricting process is truly unmistakable, as 
certain districts – or even an entire map – are pure judicial creations. Though 
this second mechanism is disfavored, to be employed only when the first 
mechanism will not produce a legal district map in time for an election,70 its 
use in redistricting is not unusual.71 A recent example came in Nevada in 2011, 
where the state legislature had deadlocked and therefore failed to satisfy the 
equal representation mandate. In response, a state court issued an order 
completely redrawing congressional and legislative maps.72 
A decree of this sort helps to illustrate the profound influence courts have 
over the redistricting process. Courts nevertheless do face important limitations 
on their ability to employ these redistricting mechanisms. Importantly, courts 
are empowered to affect district lines only insofar as the primary redistricting 
agents have failed to enact a legal map.73 To the extent that the legal deficiency 
is based on federal law, there are “essentially seven substantive constraints on 
the apportionment process,”74 which may be summarized as follows. The 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that each plan (1) comply with the equal 
representation principle;75(2) not purposefully discriminate against racial 
minorities;76 (3) not “subordinate” what the Supreme Court has called “tra-
ditional race-neutral districting principles” to racial considerations unless that 
subordination can survive strict scrutiny;77 and (4) in theory, at least, avoid 
 
69 See, e.g., In re Petition of Reapportionment Comm’n, No. SC 18907, at *1 (Conn. 
Sup. Ct. 2012), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/SC18907_021012.pdf 
(ordering that a court-drawn plan of congressional districting “shall have the full force of 
law”). 
70 Wise, 437 U.S. at 540. 
71 See Issacharoff, supra note 66, at 1688-90. 
72 See Order Adopting and Approving Special Masters’ Report and Redistricting Maps as 
Modified by the Court at 3-4, Guy v. Miller, No. 11-OC-00042-1B (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 
2011). 
73 As discussed above, members of the fallback tier may contribute to such failures in 
certain circumstances. See supra note 56. 
74 Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 731, 733 (1998). 
75 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 
(1964). 
76 See, e.g., Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(three-judge court); see also, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); cf. 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960). 
77 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993). 
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excessive political gerrymandering.78 Federal statutory law in turn requires that 
a plan (5) not result in a dilution of minority voting strength (a “section 2” 
claim);79 (6) in certain jurisdictions, not reduce minority voting strength as 
compared to prior levels (a “section 5” claim);80 and (7) in congressional races, 
not use multi-member districts.81 Depending on the jurisdiction, there also may 
be restrictions set forth in state law.82 For a court to redraw map lines, it must 
cite one of these restrictions as justification. This may not be difficult, 
however, particularly when a jurisdiction violates the equal representation 
principle by simply failing to redistrict.83 
A second set of limitations relates to the criteria courts are permitted to 
consider when redrawing a map. A court normally may not, for example, 
redistrict for partisan ends,84 but rather must apply “neutral” criteria when 
drafting plans.85 It must take into account the preferences and policies of the 
primary redistricting agents whenever possible,86 and it normally must comply 
 
78 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986); Karlan, supra note 74, at 733; see also 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). This is frequently referred to as a “Section 2” claim as it 
derives from section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. This is frequently referred to as a “Section 5” claim as it 
derives from section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
81 Karlan, supra note 74, at 733-34; see also 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2006).  
82 In Florida, for example, voters recently enacted by initiative a number of strict 
constraints on both state legislative and congressional redistricting, with one of the most 
prominent of the new rules prohibiting the drawing of any district with “the intent to favor 
or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.” FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20; see also id. § 21. 
83 After each decennial census, jurisdictions are required to redistrict pursuant to the 
equal representation principle recognized in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and its 
progeny. These cases, which require that certain district populations be nearly equal in 
population, have created a regime whereby even slight population shifts – which as a 
practical matter are inevitable in the span of a decade – turn a jurisdiction’s failure to 
redistrict once every ten years into an easily proven constitutional violation. 
84 See, e.g., Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66, 76-77 (N.M. 2012) (“Despite our discomfort 
with political considerations, we conclude that when New Mexico courts are required to 
draw a redistricting map, they must do so with the appearance of and actual neutrality. The 
courts should not select a plan that seeks partisan advantage.”); see also Wyche v. Madison 
Parish Police Jury, 635 F.2d 1151, 1160 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[A] court is forbidden to take into 
account the purely political considerations that might be appropriate for legislative 
bodies.”).  
85 See, e.g., Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 529, 540 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (“In addition to 
the constitutional and statutory criteria, federal redistricting courts generally apply neutral 
factors, including compactness, contiguity, and respect for historical local political 
boundaries, in drafting congressional redistricting plans.”). 
86 See, e.g., Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 941 (2012) (“[A] district court should take 
guidance from the State’s recently enacted plan in drafting an interim plan. . . . This Court 
has observed before that ‘faced with the necessity of drawing district lines by judicial order, 
a court, as a general rule, should be guided by the legislative policies underlying’ a state 
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with all the constitutional and statutory mandates that also constrain primary 
redistricting agents.87 Despite these limitations, courts retain considerable 
discretion in determining how to redraw map lines. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, however, courts’ involvement in redistricting 
is profoundly limited by the ubiquitous set of actors already mentioned. These 
are the redistricting litigants, whose control over the process is as fundamental 
as it has been overlooked. 
b. Litigants as Fallback Redistricting Agents 
Courts may be the most conspicuous of fallback redistricting agents, but 
they do not – indeed, they cannot – act alone. Rather, courts depend on 
litigants. As a result, litigants exercise enormous influence over the 
redistricting process, particularly once it has reached the fallback phase. 
To some degree, litigants’ influence over the process is a predictable and 
necessary consequence of the “litigant-driven model of American civil 
adjudication.”88 Indeed, many of the ways litigants exercise their influence can 
be inferred from the civil rules: at the very outset of a case, a redistricting 
litigant makes a monumental decision – where to file suit – that very well may 
affect the map that ultimately becomes law. Throughout the litigation, similar 
actions work to affect the process and influence the outcome. The litigant 
decides which claims to bring and which to ignore, which claims to defend and 
which to concede, which intervention motions to challenge and which to 
support, which evidence to proffer and which to disregard, which maps to 
challenge and which to propose, and even something as deceptively simple as 
which dates should be included in a proposed scheduling order. The examples 
are hardly comprehensive, as redistricting litigants make decisions throughout 
the life of a lawsuit in their efforts to affect district lines. 
These decisions, and the legal mechanisms through which litigants 
effectuate them, may appear unremarkable to those familiar with civil 
litigation. Yet the influence that litigants have in a courtroom has particular 
consequences in the context of redistricting. These qualities, which are 
discussed in detail in Part II, confirm the privileged position that litigants play 
in the redistricting process. 
In short, redistricting litigants – that is, those who litigate for the purpose of 
affecting the shape of electoral districts – serve as critical participants in the 
fallback phase of redistricting. The fallback phase, in turn, serves as a critical 
stage of each jurisdiction’s redistricting regime. Redistricting litigants in this 
sense have become more than litigants. They have become powerful, legally 
sanctioned agents of redistricting. 
 
plan . . . ‘to the extent those policies do not lead to violations of the Constitution or the 
Voting Rights Act.’” (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79 (1997)). 
87 See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. 
88 Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 705, 722 n.66 (2004). 
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C. Where Redistricting Litigants Fit into the Current Conception of the 
Redistricting Process 
Given the importance of litigants in contemporary redistricting, one would 
expect to find a robust body of literature examining redistricting litigants and 
their participation. Yet one finds very little. With rare exception, the scholarly 
accounts either ignore litigants or conflate them with the courts before which 
they appear.89 Even courts, which must interact with these actors, rarely flag 
the extent to which the judicial system relies on litigant participation, examine 
the potential for procedural manipulation, or otherwise acknowledge the role 
that litigants play. Rather, both scholars and courts tend to proceed as though 
litigants are non-entities in the redistricting process, even as these actors 
exercise such a pivotal role.90 
It is nevertheless true that scholars have studied extensively the substantive 
standards governing redistricting, particularly as those standards are, or should 
be, applied by the courts. Indeed, “[a] major theme of election law scholarship 
over the last decade has been that judicial oversight of the devices of 
democracy is desirable to foster adequate political competition,”91 and even 
 
89 With respect to the exceptions, Professor Karlan has provided one of the starkest 
acknowledgements to date of litigants’ influence over the redistricting process. Identifying 
certain “opportunities for procedural manipulation” that exist in redistricting litigation, she 
concludes that “the Voting Rights Act is ripe for partisan capture.” Karlan, supra note 63, at 
1733; see also id. at 1726-29 (discussing forum selection). Professor Cox has alluded to a 
similar dynamic, citing “partisan adjudication and partisan capture of the litigation process” 
as a concern in the context of proposing certain procedural reforms. Adam Cox, Partisan 
Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 800 (2004). Other scholars, 
such as Professor Buchman, have approached the issue from a political scientist’s 
perspective, questioning the institutional capacity of redistricting courts by studying, among 
other things, the implications of litigant control over courts’ “policy-making agenda.” 
JEREMY BUCHMAN, DRAWING LINES IN QUICKSAND 91 (2003). A number of scholars have 
analyzed the effect of litigant participation on a more general level or in other contexts. See, 
e.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1457, 1490, 1497, 1514 (2003) (discussing the theory that “litigants, rather than 
judges, drive judicial outcomes,” and ultimately concluding that “[w]hile it is very possible, 
and even likely, that strategic litigant decisions may influence the outcome of some cases, 
those cases appear to be isolated and infrequent”); David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: 
The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 808, 865-66 (2004) (discussing the effect of litigant injury on public law outcomes and 
touching briefly on standing in the redistricting context); Peters, supra note 88 (addressing 
litigant speech intended to influence court decisions). This Article seeks to draw upon and 
advance these scholarly accounts. 
90 It is true that scholarship directed at other forms of litigation, including so-called 
“public law litigation,” at times pays closer attention to the role that litigants play. Yet the 
existing literature in these fields fails to analyze the specific nature and implications of 
redistricting-related challenges, and as such it does not adequately capture the particular 
phenomenon that is redistricting litigation. 
91 Richard L. Hasen, Judges as Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for 
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today many scholars “continue to urge the courts to intervene more deeply” as 
they advance new refinements of the relevant standards.92 These works, while 
tremendously valuable, nevertheless tend to forgo sustained analysis into the 
procedural and practical implications of the court proceedings they envision. 
An increasingly robust body of literature has delved deeper, examining not 
only the substance but also the procedures of redistricting litigation.93 
Meanwhile, a “new generation of legal scholars” has been challenging a 
premise that underlies many of these works – that is, that the courts have the 
ability “to act as [a] neutral redistricting referee”94 – as part of the movement 
termed the “New Institutionalism.”95 Throughout these debates, scholars have 
questioned whether, and to what extent, courts should take precedence over 
alternative institutions (or vice versa) in designing and supervising elections.96 
These discussions – at once tackling issues of democratic design, 
legitimacy, and institutional competence, all in the highly charged and 
consequential context of redistricting – have helped to illuminate the 
significance of who redistricts and are otherwise of great value. They 
nevertheless remain incomplete, for they tend to ignore the critical role that 
litigants play throughout the process. This means, for example, that they 
analyze courts’ decisions to “enter the judicial thicket” without recognizing 
that litigants, and not courts, are the ones initially making such decisions.97 
 
Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 101, 
101 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011); see also, 
e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 594; Persily, supra note 5, at 650. 
92 Cain, supra note 2, at 1811. 
93 See, e.g., BUCHMAN, supra note 89, at 1; Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging 
the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) [hereinafter Cox & Miles, Judging 
the VRA]; Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of 
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1493-94, 1527-35 (2008) [hereinafter 
Cox & Miles, Judicial Ideology] (setting forth empirical data relating to the significance of 
who redistricts, in the context of judicial redistricting); Karlan, supra note 74, at 733; 
Karlan, supra note 63, at 1705; Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A 
Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1146-47 (2005) 
(providing a practical guide for courts charged with redistricting); Michael E. Solimine, 
Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme 
Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767 (2007) (discussing unusual procedures implicated by election 
law cases). 
94 Cain, supra note 2, at 1811. 
95 See Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration Reform and the New Institutionalism, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2010) (“Faced with little action by the courts and Congress, 
some election law scholars, whom I dub ‘New Institutionalists,’ have turned to institutional 
design.”). 
96 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
97 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 595 (“While the Court’s willingness to enter the 
‘political thicket’ was of tremendous jurisprudential significance, the underlying insight was 
hardly a great conceptual breakthrough.”); see also id. (describing courts’ “oversight of the 
political arena” without mentioning litigants). 
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They subject redistricting precedents to critical analysis without reflecting on 
how each decision is inexorably intertwined with litigants’ actions, arguments, 
and strategic choices – and, moreover, how each of these precedents is 
dependent on litigants for its continued enforcement.98 They propose reforms – 
often, ironically, in an effort to divorce redistricting from self-interested 
manipulation or partisan control – that can be implemented only through the 
courts, and therefore only through the initiative of litigants who themselves are 
self-interested and often have partisan ties.99 In short, they pay insufficient 
attention to redistricting litigants, who, as a result, have managed to secure a 
position in the current conception of the redistricting process that drastically 
underestimates their influence and spares them critical scrutiny. 
D. Why Understanding the Role of Litigants Matters 
The preceding discussion has identified the central observation motivating 
this Article’s analysis: litigants are important and distinct agents of 
redistricting, upon whom the process relies, who are capable of affecting 
redistricting in deliberate and potentially outcome-determinative ways. What 
the discussion has yet to address, at least directly, is why these observations 
matter. The remainder of this Article aims to provide an answer to precisely 
this question. Before delving into such detail, however, it is helpful to provide 
an overview of what is at stake. 
Stated succinctly, understanding the role that litigants play in redistricting is 
significant for everyone involved. It certainly is important for scholars, as 
litigants’ role in the process is an essential part of understanding how 
redistricting operates in the United States. And the importance of recognizing 
litigants’ role in the process extends beyond the descriptive; it is equally vital 
for the normative and prescriptive reasons identified below. 
Indeed, understanding the role of litigants is essential to those committed to 
reform. Perhaps most critically, this is because nearly all redistricting-related 
reforms implicitly rely on litigants for implementation or enforcement. This is 
almost certainly true when the suggested reform is meant to be administered 
through the courts. Yet nearly all types of reforms rely on litigants at least as 
backstops; if the primary redistricting agents fail to comply with the relevant 
rule, recourse normally is obtainable through litigation. Litigant influence in 
this sense will affect the nature and effectiveness of a proposed reform, and it 
may even undermine its purpose. If the goal of a reform is “to ensure the 
competitive vitality of the political process,”100 for example, it is, at best, 
problematic to advocate for a court-driven reform that necessarily relies on 
litigants – who, as discussed above, tend to be associated with particular 
 
98 See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 1384-85. 
99 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 595; Persily, supra note 5, at 650. 
100 Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 597. 
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political parties or interest groups and may lack incentives to increase electoral 
competition – for implementation.101 
Understanding the role that litigants play also is critical for judges, who 
serve as central agents of fallback redistricting. These are the individuals 
empowered to administer the redistricting regimes that rely so heavily on 
litigant participation. An awareness of the ways in which litigants affect the 
process is a prerequisite to courts being able to respond (or compensate) as 
appropriate. 
Finally, understanding the role of litigants is vital to everyone – including 
every voter and constituent – with a personal stake in the redistricting process. 
This is not only because litigant participation can affect redistricting outcomes; 
it is also because litigant participation raises difficult questions of 
legitimacy.102 
In short, the participation of litigants in the redistricting process is important 
for all involved parties. And it will be for some time, for under no realistic 
scenario will litigant participation become less critical to the redistricting 
process in the foreseeable future. Reforms currently under consideration will 
not change the fundamental dynamic; as noted above, most reforms actually 
rely on litigants for implementation or enforcement, and, tellingly, even 
reforms designed to decrease the opportunities for litigation may not have 
“lessened the odds of redistricting-related litigation or the sore-loser incentive 
to try to get a better plan out of the courts.”103 Nor are the courts poised to 
fundamentally alter the status quo. It is true that the courts’ resolution of 
certain cases and legal controversies may affect the types of substantive claims 
that redistricting litigants bring. Yet none of these doctrinal developments has 
even the potential to undermine the central role that litigants play in the 
process, particularly in light of the litigation sure to follow any new 
constitutional holdings and the very real possibility of state law restrictions on 
the redistricting process.104 With the stakes in mind, it is time to turn to the 
implications: to the curious regime that has resulted from this delegation of 
redistricting authority. 
II. THE POWER DELEGATED TO THESE LITIGANTS AND THE CURIOUS REGIME 
THAT RESULTS 
In the United States, the task of developing enforceable electoral lines has 
been delegated, in significant part, to the ad hoc, heterogeneous, and largely 
self-selected group of actors known as redistricting litigants. This Part presents 
the case for why the delegation matters. Forced through the mold of civil 
 
101 For discussion of reforms that take into account litigant influence, see infra Part III.B. 
102 See infra text accompanying note 230. 
103 Cain, supra note 2, at 1812 (discussing independent citizen commissions). 
104 See generally Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular 
Initiatives to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 333 
(2007); supra note 82. 
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litigation, this delegation has created a form of redistricting that is highly 
susceptible to litigant manipulation. It has, in other words, created a form of 
redistricting that grants profound – albeit thus far largely unacknowledged – 
power to those who choose to litigate. 
A. A Curious Form of Litigation 
There is much about the practice of litigating as redistricting that is 
remarkable. The power delegated to redistricting litigants has direct effects on 
democratic design. These effects are jurisdiction-wide, as redistricting courts 
are empowered to fashion unusually broad and intrusive remedies even as they 
are expected to rely on a handful of litigants to represent the interests of an 
entire electorate. The redistricting process from start to finish is profoundly 
politicized, what scholars have called “politics pure, fraught with the capacity 
for self-dealing and cynical manipulation,”105 and it is one that leads to fierce 
battles between political parties as well as acute concerns over federalism and 
separation of powers.106 The act of redistricting through the courts is all this 
and more – yet it is exercised not through a specialized set of procedures, but 
rather through the traditional mechanisms of civil litigation. 
This combination has led to a litigant-empowering process of redistricting 
that is manifested most prominently through three defining features: (1) the 
flexible and forgiving regime it offers to those electing to litigate; (2) its failure 
to protect the interests of non-parties; and (3) a shifting regime of legal 
standards that has developed in response to the exigencies of the election cycle. 
Individually, each of these features has significant effects on the way 
redistricting litigation unfolds. Combined, they produce a redistricting regime 
that is ripe for litigant control. 
1. The Warm Embrace of Litigants 
Redistricting is nothing if not hospitable to litigants. It invites them in; it 
offers them power; it forgives their bad manners. In part, the arrangement is an 
unavoidable consequence of jurisdictions’ heavy dependence on litigants as 
agents of fallback redistricting. By delegating so much, redistricting regimes in 
the United States ensure that litigants will enjoy a prominent seat at the table. 
Yet it is the way these litigants are treated – the favorable treatment they 
receive, even within the litigant-centered world of civil litigation – that 
characterizes redistricting litigation as particularly accommodating of litigants. 
Several doctrines provide powerful illustrations of this dynamic. The 
doctrines of standing and forum selection, for example, operate and interact in 
ways that privilege redistricting litigants, giving them significant flexibility 
and power as they work toward the redistricting outcomes they desire. 
Likewise, the power associated with claim selection, a formidable source of 
 
105 Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 588. 
106 Among other things, “court-drawn plans can present one of the most intense 
interbranch conflicts that our constitutional system allows.” Persily, supra note 93, at 1146. 
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influence available to nearly any litigant, is in certain respects magnified in the 
redistricting context. Each of these doctrines is addressed in turn. 
a. Standing 
In the redistricting context, standing doctrine is a legal maladroit, frequently 
criticized and seemingly unable to do anything well. It makes little sense as a 
conceptual matter.107 It often is unclear in application.108 And, perhaps most 
important, it fails to impose practical constraints on any reasonably 
sophisticated party wishing to litigate a redistricting case. It is this last 
characteristic that most favors litigants. 
It is true that to establish standing in federal court, a redistricting litigant 
normally, though not always, must reside as a voter in the jurisdiction he or she 
is seeking to challenge.109 As a doctrinal matter, the theory behind this rule 
appears to be that if a voter is placed in an unlawfully drawn district, that voter 
personally suffers harms associated with that unlawfulness.110 While this 
residence-related limitation might be significant in the abstract, it has almost 
no effect in practice. This is because, for any given claim, a vast number of 
individuals fit the bill. Millions of voters might have standing to bring a 
routine equal-representation challenge in response to a state’s failure to 
redistrict; a smaller number of voters – but one still in the tens or hundreds of 
thousands – might have standing to bring a district-specific challenge in most 
other jurisdictions. What is more, even those without standing are not, as a 
practical matter, precluded from advancing a claim: if a party wishes to 
participate in redistricting litigation, that party can do so simply by locating a 
geographically eligible voter willing to serve as a stand-in. This task is made 
relatively straightforward – at least, for any moderately sophisticated party – 
by the enormous number of individuals with standing to assert a given claim. 
An interest group headquartered in Washington, D.C., for example, easily can 
participate in a legal challenge to electoral districts in Alabama, Utah, or 
California; it simply must find a group member, or any other individual 
sympathetic to the group’s cause, who lives in the relevant district and is 
willing to serve as the nominal litigant. There is little risk or downside for the 
litigant volunteer, who has no practical risk of counterclaims and presumably 
is indemnified for all possible costs. This is not a hypothetical arrangement 
 
107 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in 
Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998). 
108 See, e.g., Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179, 180-85 (2011). 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995). See generally Zipkin, 
supra note 108, at 180. Exceptions to this residence requirement include circumstances 
where the plaintiffs “can show ‘specific evidence’ that they ‘personally’ were subject to a 
racial classification,” see id. at 193 (quoting Hays, 515 U.S. at 745), or when the plaintiff 
brings certain types of vote-dilution claims, see Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the 
Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1690 (2001). 
110 See, e.g., Hays, 515 U.S. at 744-45. 
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dreamed up by theorists; the practice, though difficult to monitor, appears to be 
routine.111 
What this means, as a practical matter, is that the courthouse doors are open 
to anyone wishing to participate in redistricting litigation, so long as that party 
is able and willing to incur the costs of litigation and, where necessary, to 
coordinate with a geographically convenient third party. While analogs may 
exist in other contexts,112 such a regime remains procedurally unusual. The 
legal barriers imposed by the standing doctrines normally do have real 
practical effects, even in the more flexible realm of impact litigation: they 
make it difficult, for example, for an environmental organization to challenge a 
regulation affecting endangered species across the world,113 and they make it 
virtually impossible for a taxpayer to challenge certain executive actions taken 
in alleged violation of the First Amendment.114 In more routine matters, they 
impose significant barriers for any litigant hoping to pursue sweeping forms of 
relief. What they fail to do is limit, in any meaningful sense, who participates 
in redistricting litigation. And it is in this sense that redistricting litigation 
proves, right at the outset of a case, quite hospitable to litigants. 
b. Forum Selection 
The advantages of the flexible standing regime extend beyond the opening 
of courthouse doors. The standing doctrines, coupled with traditional venue 
rules, also create a particularly plaintiff-friendly system for determining who 
will serve as the judicial mediator in this system of fallback redistricting. These 
doctrines combine, in other words, to empower redistricting plaintiffs wishing 
to select a judge through forum selection. 
For purposes of this discussion, forum selection refers to decisions made by 
litigants concerning where to litigate when more than one forum is legally 
available. For redistricting litigants, the selection normally is confined to a 
particular state: plaintiffs challenging New York’s electoral districts, for 
example, must file their lawsuits in federal or state court in New York. In 
determining the significance of this practice, it may be helpful to think of 
litigants attempting to secure not a given forum, but rather a given judge. This 
is because, in the redistricting context, the most important consequence of the 
exercise is its effect on the likelihood that certain judges will adjudicate the 
case – in other words, that certain judges will serve as the fallback-tier 
 
111 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
112 See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondent at 28, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 
(2008) (No. 07-371) (arguing that in public right cases “the number of plaintiffs with 
standing is potentially limitless” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
113 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-67 (1992) (holding that 
environmental-litigation plaintiffs failed to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement). 
114 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 600 (2007) (discussing 
the difficulties taxpayers face in establishing standing to bring Establishment Clause 
claims). 
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redistricting agents empowered to mediate between the litigants and the maps 
they seek to affect. 
Of course, for selection among forums potentially to make a difference, it 
must be true that courts are neither fungible nor perceived to be fungible. At 
least when stated at a high level of generality, these empirical assertions appear 
to be sound. Few would defend the proposition that courts, or judges, are 
perfectly interchangeable, and such an understanding is confirmed in the 
redistricting context through empirical studies as well as by the perception of 
courts held by lawyers, commentators, and the general public.115 While natural 
experiments are hard to come by – as it is rare for multiple courts to be 
litigating substantially identical lawsuits – the occasional unfolding of parallel 
lawsuits has confirmed that different courts may indeed reach different 
redistricting outcomes.116 Selecting forum, in other words, does appear to 
affect the ultimate outcome in redistricting suits – which means that it affects 
electoral lines. 
So, then, to what extent are redistricting litigants able to select their forums? 
The short answer is that while certain limitations do exist, redistricting litigants 
(or, more specifically, plaintiffs) are otherwise able to exercise close to 
unfettered control over which judges will adjudicate their claims. 
Texas serves as a particularly helpful model. Its last two decades of 
redistricting illustrate vividly the ease with which redistricting litigants can 
 
115 See, e.g., Cain, supra note 2, at 1836; Cox & Miles, Judicial Ideology, supra note 93, 
at 1493-94 (identifying scholarship supporting the conclusions that “Democratic appointees 
were more likely than Republican appointees to vote for liability” under a key provision of 
the Voting Rights Act and that “a judge’s race had an even greater effect than partisanship 
on the likelihood of favoring liability”); Persily, supra note 93, at 1146 (“Courts vary 
considerably in how and when they draw their maps, whom they get to help them, who will 
have input into the process and when, and whether they will make changes to a plan once it 
is released. . . . The choice of different procedures can have a dramatic impact on the final 
plan that emerges.”). A recent illustration of how judges can be popularly portrayed in the 
context of redistricting emerges from Pennsylvania. In the lead-up to the 2009 elections, 
“the political parties emphasized the critical need to win the [open seat on the state supreme 
court] because of the upcoming legislative redistricting process that [would] likely end up 
before the Supreme Court.” Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Electing 
Judges or Judicial Independence? It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial 
Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, 868-69 (2010); see also, e.g., id. at 868 n.27 (“Lt. Gov. 
Joe Scarnati’s letter to fellow Republicans . . . was unusually blunt. ‘Control of the Supreme 
Court is on the ballot this year . . . and you know the courts play a key role in finalizing 
redistricting maps that will set the political landscape for the next decade.’”). After the 
election, one newspaper described the results as follows: “Orie Melvin Wins . . . . The GOP 
will control state’s Supreme Court after bitter race.” Id. at 868 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Debra Todd, Lady Justice Is Nonpartisan, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
Nov. 23, 2009, at B7)). 
116 See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 27-28, 37-38 (1993) (describing different 
results reached by state and federal courts adjudicating redistricting challenges that, in 
relevant part, were identical). 
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select a preferred forum. In 2001, legislative deadlock left in place an old 
district map, which failed to apportion Texas’s population equally among 
districts as required by law.117 As a result, litigants challenged the map based 
on the equal representation doctrine in at least seven separate forums, 
including four separate state courts.118 According to the Texas Supreme Court, 
each of these four state courts was a viable forum for litigating the underlying 
redistricting claims.119 Though the court pointedly bemoaned the lack of 
“adequate procedures for judicial administration to prevent undesirable forum-
shopping” that already had become endemic in redistricting litigation,120 it 
nevertheless felt compelled to reward the practice. The court concluded that 
venue would be dictated by whichever forum-selecting party had timed its 
filing properly and, in that sense, had won the race to the courthouse.121 
The pointed comments by the Texas Supreme Court did little to bring 
reform in Texas, and the result was predictable. In 2011 the state saw litigants 
file similar redistricting challenges in eight different forums – for a combined 
fourteen competing lawsuits – all before the legislature even had enacted the 
congressional map being challenged.122 The situation was again criticized from 
the bench, as a federal district judge bemoaned the “forum shopping” reflected 
by the “filing of patently ridiculous actions months before there is a 
redistricting plan [to] which to object.”123 
At both the state and federal level, Texas’s forum-selection regime produces 
startling results, but it is no anomaly. To the contrary, it exemplifies the way 
forum is determined in many jurisdictions.124 As such, the regime confirms that 
 
117 Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 242-43 (Tex. 2001). 
118 See id. at 242-43, 243 n.10. 
119 Id. at 252-56. 
120 Id. at 243-44. 
121 Id. at 253. 
122 See Rodriguez v. Perry, No. A–11–CA–451, 2011 WL 3209075, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 
July 27, 2011) (Yeakel, J., dissenting). 
123 Id. at *3. 
124 See, e.g., OHIO R. CIV. P. 3(B)(1), (6); IND. R. TRIAL P. 75(A); see also, e.g., R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 9-4-3 (permitting suit to be brought in any jurisdiction “in which some one of 
the plaintiffs or defendants shall dwell”); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 4221 (McKinney) 
(providing that, upon the petition of any citizen, “[a]n apportionment by the legislature shall 
be subject to review” by the state trial courts but failing to impose any limitation as to which 
trial court may conduct this review other than that it be “where any . . . petitioner resides”). 
An exception comes in Minnesota, which has responded to its own generally applicable 
venue regime with a judicially developed practice of appointing a multi-judge panel to hear 
redistricting cases. After a lawsuit is filed in Minnesota state court but before there has been 
any determination on the merits, a party petitions the Chief Justice, who then appoints the 
multi-judge panel. This practice effectively negates any effect of forum selection within the 
state. See, e.g., Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. Spec. Redistricting Panel 2012) 
(drawing lines following the 2010 Census); Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, No. C0-01-160 (Minn. 
Spec. Redistricting Panel Mar. 19, 2002) (same, for the 2000 Census). 
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redistricting litigants often can, in effect, disregard the limits imposed by the 
venue statutes and simply select the forum most likely to secure a preferred 
judge. While this may not be a unique ability – insofar as litigants in certain 
other litigation contexts may encounter similarly little difficulty in 
circumventing venue-related restrictions125 – the analogs do not detract from 
the fact that forum-selection regimes permit litigants to dictate a fundamental 
feature of fallback redistricting and, moreover, that this degree of control 
remains outside the norm for most civil litigants. 
At a fundamental level, this regime reflects a direct but unintended 
consequence of relying on a trans-substantive approach to civil procedure. 
More specifically, the regime is a result of the application of general venue 
rules to the unusual sorts of claims that drive redistricting lawsuits. A 
discussion of the relevant legal doctrines helps to explain how this works. 
There are three scenarios in which redistricting litigants face the possibility of 
selecting a forum: (1) when selecting a forum within the federal system, (2) 
when selecting a forum within the state system, and (3) when selecting 
between the federal and state systems. It is in the first two scenarios that 
redistricting litigants exercise the most significant control. The federal regime 
illustrates why. 
In federal court the generally applicable venue statute applies to redistricting 
lawsuits. Venue therefore is appropriate in “a judicial district where any 
defendant resides” or “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the 
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”126 With respect to the 
prototypical redistricting claim – a statewide equal representation claim – 
litigants and most courts have interpreted this venue statute to permit, at a 
minimum, filings in the judicial district where the state government sits (that 
is, “where [the] defendant resides”), as well as filings in any judicial district 
where an electoral district is overpopulated as compared to the state average.127 
A creative set of litigants might expand the options even further by arguing 
that because statewide redistricting necessarily affects lines across the entire 
state, a “substantial part” of the events giving rise to an equal representation 
claim occurs in every district in the state, and so venue would be proper in any 
district.128 Even if a court were to reject this more aggressive application of the 
 
125 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy 
Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141 (2006). 
126 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2006). 
127 See, e.g., Clark v. Marx, No. 11-2149, 2012 WL 41926, at *6 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2012); 
Molinari v. Bloomberg, No. CV-08-4539, 2008 WL 5412433, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 
2008). The latter set of venues – that is, any judicial district where an electoral district is 
overpopulated as compared to the state average – is available under the theory that a 
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the redistricting claim occurred in 
that same district. Id. at *5. 
128 As one court put it, “the effects of the redistricting legislation challenged in this case 
will be ‘profoundly felt’ in practically every voting district throughout the State of Texas.” 
Thomas v. Bush, No. H-95-0237, slip op. at 7-8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 1995) (rejecting this 
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venue statute, a motivated litigant should be able to secure venue in a given 
district through other means – including by adding a separate claim more 
closely associated with a particular electoral district contained in that judicial 
district.129 In short, the application of the federal venue statute tends to permit 
filing of federal redistricting claims anywhere in the state. Federal redistricting 
litigants in this sense exercise a formidable power over who will adjudicate 
their case – and therefore who will serve as the agent meant to mediate their 
participation in the process. 
An analogous pattern also holds in many state-court systems. This is 
because many American jurisdictions likewise depend on generally applicable 
venue statutes for some or all redistricting challenges.130 It is in these 
jurisdictions that litigants tend to enjoy wide latitude in selecting a forum. This 
is true in Texas, for example, where state redistricting litigants proceed under a 
general venue statute that is analogous to the federal statute.131 As in federal 
court, therefore, a litigant in Texas state court has a good chance of being able 
to file suit anywhere in the state, and thereby increase his or her odds of 
securing a preferred judge. 
Two sets of caveats should be acknowledged. At the outset, it is true that 
redistricting litigants select a forum; they do not select a judge. As a result, 
litigants will not always be able to secure a preferred judge simply by 
strategically selecting a forum. This distinction, while important, should not be 
overstated. Forum selection and judge selection are closely related. By 
securing a forum, a plaintiff normally ensures that the case will be heard by 
one of a certain set of judges.132 
 
theory of venue on the ground that it would make the venue statute “lose all meaning”). 
129 The venue argument, in that case, would not be based on overpopulation, but rather 
that “a substantial part of the events or omissions” giving rise to the district-specific claim 
occurred in the district in question. Adding district-specific claims is also how a plaintiff 
might attempt to secure a preferred forum in the absence of a statewide equal-representation 
claim. 
130 A non-exhaustive list of jurisdictions without any redistricting-specific venue statutes 
includes Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. A number of 
other jurisdictions have redistricting-specific venue rules that apply only to certain types of 
challenges or district maps. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 7; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 13. 
131 This statute provides for venue in Texas state courts “in the county in which all or a 
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” or in the county 
where the defendant either resides or has its principal office. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 15.002 (West 2002). 
132 If a plaintiff were to file suit in New York’s New York County, for example, he or 
she is ensuring that the case will be heard by one of eight particular trial court judges (and, 
consequently, not by any of the trial court judges from the other sixty-one judicial counties 
across the state). Depending on local rules and orders, a litigant may be able to narrow such 
a group down even further. For example, if a case were filed in the Austin Division of the 
Western District of Texas while a certain jurisdiction-wide order had been in effect, litigants 
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It likewise is true that in both the state and the federal systems there are 
several important limitations on the ability of redistricting plaintiffs to dictate 
venue. Three warrant particular mention. First, litigants tend to enjoy relatively 
little control with respect to whether a given redistricting claim ultimately will 
be adjudicated in the state or federal court system. This limitation derives from 
a confused combination of judicially created doctrines and federal statutes.133 
The jumble of rules does not, however, prevent a truly motivated plaintiff – 
that is, one willing to sacrifice otherwise available claims simply to secure 
forum – from ensuring the case will proceed in either the state or federal 
system. It likewise does not impede litigants’ ability to select a forum within 
either of the two parallel systems. 
The second major limitation applies only to federal courts, as it derives from 
a federal statute requiring that many, though not all, redistricting cases be 
heard by a three-judge panel.134 The first member of this three-judge panel is 
the judge to which the case originally is assigned.135 Litigants triggering the 
three-judge-panel statute are therefore able – through forum selection – to 
affect who will serve as the first panel judge. The second two judges, by 
contrast, are selected by the chief judge of the circuit in which the case is being 
brought, and litigants have no formal mechanism to influence the chief judge’s 
decisions. As such, the effect of forum selection in the federal courts is muted 
by the panel statute. Still, the effect is by no means eradicated. Among other 
things, certain aspects of a judge’s identity, including his or her partisan 
affiliation, are likely to affect how the other judges on the panel adjudicate the 
case.136 
The final major limitation applies only to certain state jurisdictions. This 
limitation stems from narrowly applicable laws that dictate forum specifically 
 
would be assured that the case would be assigned to one of three judges based on certain 
percentage calculations. See Amended Order Assigning the Business of the Court, Western 
District of Texas (filed Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/rules/stdor 
d/district/botc.pdf.  
133 Most prominently, various authorities prevent federal courts from adjudicating certain 
state redistricting claims. For example, the “Growe doctrine” requires that federal courts in 
particular circumstances defer adjudication of federal redistricting claims to state courts. See 
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993). In addition, a defendant normally can remove 
a case, including one involving redistricting-related claims, from state to federal court, so 
long as it originally could have been filed in federal district court. See, e.g., Yatauro v. 
Mangano, No. 11-CV-3079, 2011 WL 2610562, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2011); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). 
134 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (“A district court of three judges shall be convened . . . when an 
action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional 
districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”). 
135 Id. § 2284(b)(1). 
136 See Cox & Miles, Judging the VRA, supra note 93, at 25-29, 34-37 (providing 
evidence that “panel effects” have strong influence in redistricting litigation). 
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for redistricting-related lawsuits.137 Where such a law applies, it has a profound 
effect – and one that warrants special attention for those interested in reform. 
While each of the state jurisdictions has its own venue regime, they can be 
separated into two broad categories: states that have laws specifically dictating 
forum for redistricting lawsuits, and states that do not. The range of state-court 
choices available to a redistricting litigant tends to depend, more than anything, 
on this particular distinction. While, as noted above, many jurisdictions depend 
on generally applicable venue statutes for redistricting challenges, a 
surprisingly high percentage do have redistricting-specific venue rules.138 Of 
these jurisdictions, many require redistricting challenges to go directly to the 
state supreme court.139 In a smaller number of states, redistricting-related 
claims are funneled to a particular trial court.140 These constitutional and 
statutory provisions do not completely eliminate forum selection, given, among 
other things, the possibility that a particular challenge will proceed in the 
federal system.141 Nevertheless, each regime significantly reduces the forum-
selection opportunities litigants otherwise might have. 
Combined, these three major limitations on forum selection – limitations 
that funnel cases into either the state or federal court system; that require a 
three-judge panel in various federal lawsuits; and that, in certain states, force 
litigants to comply with redistricting-specific venue rules – do constrain 
litigants in certain respects. Yet they apply only in certain jurisdictions and 
only under certain, limited circumstances. 
Otherwise, the normal constraints on litigants’ ability to select venue – 
constraints that reduce the potency of forum selection in many other forms of 
litigation – prove ineffectual in the redistricting context. One constraint relates 
 
137 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 29-1-2.5(a) (“Any legal action which contests the validity of 
any redistricting or reapportionment plan, or any portion of any such plan, for the state 
Senate, state House of Representatives, United States Congress, State Board of Education, 
or any other statewide redistricting or reapportionment plan, or portion of any other 
statewide plan, enacted by the Legislature, shall be commenced in the Circuit Court of 
Montgomery County.”). 
138 More than twenty states, including those identified below, have some redistricting-
specific venue rule on the books. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. Often, 
these rules apply only to certain types of challenges or maps. See, e.g., Brown v. 
Butterworth, 831 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that a certain provision 
of the Florida Constitution – one that requires that review of certain district maps be 
conducted by the Florida Supreme Court – “is limited to claims of facial invalidity involving 
the one-person, one-vote principle as well as the specific districting requirements of the state 
constitution” but that “[a]ll as-applied constitutional and VRA challenges . . . must be 
brought in a court of competent jurisdiction,” which includes the state’s circuit courts); see 
also FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16. 
139 See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 3; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 
1909 (2002). 
140 See ALA. CODE § 29-1-2.5 (LexisNexis 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1 (2011). 
141 See supra notes 126-29, 133 and accompanying text. 
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to flexibility (or, at least, a particular type of flexibility142) in claim selection. 
In standard litigation, it often is not possible for a litigant, seeking simply to 
secure venue, to identify a non-frivolous claim closely associated with a 
particular judicial district. Yet for redistricting litigants this rarely poses a 
challenge. In part, this is due to the ease with which redistricting litigants can 
circumvent the standing rules,143 and in part it is a consequence of the number 
of electoral districts normally contained in a single judicial district. Texas, for 
example, has only 4 federal judicial districts, which collectively contain 36 
congressional electoral districts, 150 state house districts, and 31 state senate 
districts.144 Numbers of this sort make it even easier to identify a claim 
associated with a particular judicial district. As a result, redistricting litigants 
find themselves unable to include a venue-securing claim only in the rarest of 
cases. 
A second constraint relates to appellate review. At least in theory, appellate 
review should mute the effects of forum selection. This is because the practice 
helps to ensure uniformity among lower-court outcomes, so that a litigant’s 
ability to secure a preferred forum – and, by extension, a preferred judge – 
should not affect the ultimate result. While the unifying effect of appellate 
review is easily overstated,145 that effect is, in at least one important respect, 
particularly weak in the redistricting context. This is because appellate courts 
give significant deference to trial court findings of fact,146 and redistricting 
litigation is exceptionally fact intensive, involving “unusually complex factual 
patterns.”147 It is in this respect that a trial court’s redistricting rulings are more 
likely to survive appellate review. 
In short, redistricting plaintiffs, with the aim of affecting the shape of 
district lines, enjoy a venue regime that is quite accommodating of their 
 
142 It is true that redistricting litigants do face significant substantive constraints with 
respect to which claims they may bring. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. Yet they 
encounter few procedural constraints, and this latter flexibility is what facilitates forum 
selection. 
143 See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
144 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2006); Texas State Senate Districts, TEX. REDISTRICTING, http://gis1. 
tlc.state.tx.us/?PlanHeader=PLANs172 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); Texas Congressional 
Districts, TEX. REDISTRICTING, http://gis1.tlc.state.tx.us/?PlanHeader=PLANc235 (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013); Texas State House Districts, TEX. REDISTRICTING, http://gis1.tlc.state. 
tx.us/?PlanHeader=PLANh309 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
145 The unifying effect of appellate review is muted by a number of factors, including 
overcrowded dockets, failures by litigants to adequately present an appeal (or even to bring 
an appeal), and appellate deference to trial court findings of fact. 
146 Normally, findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. In some courts, the deference 
is even greater; in Texas, for example, the state supreme court lacks jurisdiction to review 
“questions of fact” in cases on review from the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Universe Life 
Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 73 (Tex. 1997) (Hecht, J., concurring in the judgment). 
147 Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (quoting Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
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preferences and therefore that facilitates their efforts to secure a preferred 
judge. It is a profound power to wield over the redistricting process. 
c. Claim Selection 
Where forum selection might be characterized as transfers of authority 
among potential redistricting agents, claim selection might be characterized as 
the setting of the courts’ agendas.148 Through this second powerful mechanism, 
litigants are again able to exercise significant control over the redistricting 
process. 
The source of this empowerment is, in a sense, straightforward: like all 
courts, redistricting courts normally can act only in response to a lawsuit.149 So 
despite the tendency of scholars to refer to redistricting adjudications as court-
driven phenomena – as forms of “judicial oversight,” as “intervention” by the 
courts, or the like – it actually is the litigants, and not the courts, making initial 
decisions concerning whether to intervene. And even when a litigant does 
challenge a district map, that decision does not permit a court to consider every 
possible legal challenge.150 Rather, the litigants  are the ones who identify the 
specific challenges to bring and the specific districts to challenge. As a result, 
even if district lines are unlawful, they will control elections unless and until 
some litigant decides to bring an on-point challenge.151 
It is true that redistricting litigants face substantive constraints with respect 
to what challenges they can bring, as the universe of recognized redistricting-
related claims is far from extensive.152 But within the universe of recognized 
causes of action, numerous precedents illustrate both the ability of redistricting 
 
148 For political theorists, the term “agenda setting,” applied in the election context, 
generally refers to an “attempt by those who structure the rules concerning presentation of 
questions to voters to create pathways that favor one or another outcome.” Issacharoff, 
supra note 5, at 595 (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 
(2d ed. 1963)). Redistricting litigants use claim selection to achieve analogous ends. This 
analogy therefore casts the redistricting litigant in an appropriate but perhaps surprising role: 
as one who structures the rules.  
149 See, e.g., Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711, 735 (Pa. 
2012) (“The Constitution neither authorizes nor requires this Court to engage in its own de 
novo review of redistricting plans in order to assure that all constitutional commands have 
been satisfied.”). 
150 Id. 
151 There are limited exceptions to this regime. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying 
text (discussing Florida’s litigation-forcing provisions and section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act). And it is true that the mere existence of legal mandates, particularly when coupled 
with the threat of litigation, has some deterrent effect.  
152 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (refusing to permit a political 
gerrymandering challenge to go forward); Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 630-31 (“One of the 
perverse consequences of the absence of any real constitutional vigilance over partisan 
gerrymandering is that litigants must squeeze all claims of improper manipulation of 
redistricting into the suffocating category of race.”). 
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litigants to use claim selection to set courts’ agendas and the significance this 
power has in the context of redistricting. The Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Perry v. Perez provides a particularly helpful example.153 In Perry, the 
district court had drawn and attempted to implement interim maps for an 
upcoming election.154 On expedited review, the Supreme Court reversed.155 
Explaining that the district court had failed to take into sufficient account the 
maps drawn by the state legislature, the Supreme Court noted that the district 
court on remand would be required “of course, . . . not to incorporate into the 
interim plan any legal defects in the state plan.”156 The Supreme Court then 
quickly confirmed that the possible range of “legal defects” is defined not by 
the court’s independent review, but rather by the “challenges” brought by 
litigants.157 It even clarified that the rule applies with respect to claims where 
the defendant bears the burden of establishing a map’s legality.158 The Court, 
in other words, confirmed that a court normally should avoid considering any 
legal challenge beyond those raised by the parties – even when the legality of 
electoral lines is at stake. 
Another striking example of agenda setting comes in the context of political-
gerrymandering claims. Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer is notable for its insistence on limiting the scope of its holding not 
only to the specific claims advanced by the litigants and their amici, but also to 
their specific legal theories.159 Justice Kennedy emphasized, in rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ claims, that the Court “should adjudicate only what is in the papers 
before [it],”160 and his opinion expressly left open the possibility that “in 
another case a standard might emerge.”161 Justice Kennedy’s approach has 
provoked criticism: as Justice Scalia asserted in the plurality opinion, “it is our 
job, not the plaintiffs’, to explicate the standard that makes the facts alleged by 
the plaintiffs adequate or inadequate to state a claim.”162 Yet even the criticism 
confirms the central role played by litigants: under Justice Scalia’s conception, 
it still remains the redistricting plaintiffs’ job to decide which claims to bring 
and which facts to allege. 
Perry and Vieth illustrate ways in which redistricting litigants limit the 
scope of court intervention by choosing not to raise certain types of claims. 
The corollary – that litigants can expand the scope of court intervention by 
 
153 Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 940 (2012). 
154 Id. at 940. 
155 Id. at 944. 
156 Id. at 941. 
157 Id. at 942. 
158 Id. at 944. 
159 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307-17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
160 Id. at 313. 
161 Id. at 312. 
162 Id. at 301 (plurality opinion). 
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raising additional claims – is no less important. This influence becomes 
particularly clear when litigants successfully prosecute a novel claim. An 
illustration of this phenomenon emerged in the context of racial 
gerrymandering. In Shaw v. Reno,163 the Supreme Court introduced a new 
doctrine into the redistricting canon. Its decision directly affected the district 
maps that would govern congressional elections in North Carolina and set an 
important precedent that would alter current and future maps across the 
country. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court did not break this new legal 
ground without litigant assistance; to the contrary, it was the decision by five 
North Carolina residents to bring the novel claim that gave the court the power 
to articulate this “entirely new cause of action.”164 The majority acknowledged 
as much: an “understanding of the nature of appellants’ claim [was] critical to 
[its] resolution of the case.”165 
In short, claim selection is a powerful tool in the context of redistricting. It 
potentially determines which legal standards will be enforced with respect to 
which electoral districts, and it directly affects the balance of power between 
agents empowered to draw district lines. Given the stakes, it is a profound 
power potentially available to redistricting litigants. 
Yet the procedural rules do little to mitigate this phenomenon. To the 
contrary, while certain judicially created doctrines – such as doctrines relating 
to standing and laches – normally impose limits on litigants’ abilities to engage 
in claim selection, these doctrines tend to have little bite in redistricting 
litigation. The permissive nature of the federal standing doctrine already has 
been discussed,166 and its application is no less forgiving in the context of 
claim selection. The flexible standing doctrine, in other words, circumvents 
standing-related barriers that otherwise might affect litigants’ abilities to select 
claims. 
The distinct doctrine of laches likewise has been applied in the redistricting 
context in a largely ineffectual fashion. This doctrine, which “penalizes a 
litigant for negligent or willful failure to assert his rights” through dismissal of 
that litigant’s otherwise meritorious claim, normally is a formidable doctrine 
governing lawsuits in equity.167 And in theory, “[t]he defense applies to 
redistricting cases as it does to any other.”168 Yet when adjudicating 
redistricting cases, many courts have expressed reluctance in applying the 
 
163 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993). 
164 Id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting). 
165 Id. at 641 (majority opinion). 
166 See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
167 Perry v. Judd, 840 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (E.D. Va. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 
1972)). 
168 Arizona Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887, 908 (D. Ariz. 2005). But see infra note 174 (discussing the 
limited holding of this case). 
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doctrine.169 Even when plaintiffs have sought to challenge a district plan years 
after it was first put in place, courts have rejected laches defenses based on 
various grounds, including the “ongoing nature of the violation,”170 that 
redistricting challenges are distinguishable from “challenges to specific 
election procedures made after the election process had begun,”171 because 
intervening Supreme Court opinions “created a new ballgame,”172 or even 
because “[f]rom a political standpoint the delay . . . [was] understandable.”173 
Others have gone so far as to conclude that the doctrine simply does not apply 
to certain types of redistricting claims.174 
In short, the doctrines of standing and laches lack the force they have in 
other contexts. These doctrinal shortcomings, coupled with the high degree of 
flexibility normally accorded to parties selecting claims, grant litigants a robust 
ability to determine which district lines are potentially subject to judicial 
redistricting. It is by using this mechanism of claim selection that redistricting 
litigants – not redistricting courts, not primary redistricting agents, and not the 
electorate at large – are able to set the courts’ agendas in powerful and 
consequential ways. 
2. The Neglect of an Unrepresented Class 
At the same time that redistricting litigation is so hospitable to litigants, it 
offers few protections to non-litigants. Initially, this may seem unremarkable: 
civil litigation rarely protects those not appearing in court. Yet this default rule 
flips – most prominently, in the class-action setting – when non-litigants will 
 
169 See, e.g., Garza v. Cnty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 772 (9th Cir. 1990); Blackmoon v. 
Charles Mix Cnty., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (D.S.D. 2005); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. 
Supp. 196, 203 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
170 Garza, 918 F.2d at 772; see also, e.g., Jeffers, 730 F. Supp. at 202. 
171 Pac for Middle Am. v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 95 C 827, 1995 WL 571887, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1995). 
172 Id. at *4. 
173 Rojas v. Moriarty, No. 91-1113-CV-W-6, 1994 WL 114669, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 
Mar. 25, 1994). 
174 See, e.g., Shapiro v. State, 336 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (D. Md. 1972) (questioning 
whether it ever would be “proper to dismiss a suit on the ground of laches and thus forever 
bar an appropriate judicial inquiry into the merits of an otherwise properly alleged cause of 
action based on ‘racial gerrymandering’ of congressional districts”); cf. Jeffers, 730 F. Supp. 
at 203 (“We will not say to these plaintiffs, ‘Wait for another census. The time is not yet 
ripe.’ They have heard these words too many times in the past.”). It is true that the doctrine 
is not entirely dead: occasionally, courts have rejected redistricting claims based on laches. 
Yet even in these instances, courts generally invoke the doctrine only when it appears the 
claim has no potential to affect an actual election, or, at most, when the claim, if successful 
and somehow adjudicated in time, could affect only one rapidly approaching election before 
the decennial redistricting mandate would restart the litigation clock. See, e.g., White v. 
Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 103 (4th Cir. 1990); Arizona Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. 
Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887, 907-09 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
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be bound by the court’s decision. In such a scenario, litigants and courts 
normally owe some duty to the affected non-parties. 
As a practical matter, redistricting litigation in many respects falls into this 
same category. Voters across an entire jurisdiction are affected in a profound 
and irreversible way when a court requires that an election go forward pursuant 
to an altered electoral map. Moreover, in light of the principles of stare decisis, 
the claims normally cannot be relitigated.175 And even if they could be, the 
realities of the election cycle mean that at least one election is likely to have 
occurred before the next round of challenges can be heard. 
Yet redistricting litigation fails to trigger protections analogous to those 
provided in the class-action context.176 There is no requirement that the legal 
representation be adequate; there is no inquiry into whether the plaintiffs’ 
claims are typical; potential conflicts between attorneys and nonlitigants are 
never explored; and no one acts as a fiduciary. Given the permissiveness of 
such a regime, it comes as little surprise that few litigants elect to pursue the 
procedurally more cumbersome route required by a class action, a decision 
made even more sensible – at least, from a plaintiff’s perspective – once it is 
recognized that the advantages of bringing a class action, including the ability 
to avoid mootness challenges and to seek far-reaching claims and remedies, are 
available to individual redistricting litigants simply as a matter of course.177 
These tensions signal the procedurally problematic nature of redistricting 
litigation. Indeed, redistricting litigation displays many of the same traits as 
another particularly difficult form of litigation: litigation defined by what 
Professor Nagareda has termed “embedded aggregation.”178 In each 
manifestation of embedded aggregation, 
a doctrinal feature of what is ostensibly individual litigation – the scope 
of the right of action asserted, the nature of the remedy sought, or the 
character of the wrong alleged – gives rise to demands for the suit to bind 
nonparties in some fashion, beyond the ordinary stare decisis effect that 
any case might exert. . . . An aggregate dimension, in short, is 
 
175 See, e.g., Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711, 736 & 
n.24 (Pa. 2012) (referring to the “bedrock rule of jurisprudence involving precedent and 
stare decisis” that precludes litigants from challenging redistricting plans based on some 
“materially indistinguishable challenge” that already was raised and rejected in a prior 
decision).  
176 While it is true that some litigants do bring redistricting claims as class actions, that is 
the exception. See, e.g., Newman v. Hunt, 787 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Ramos v. 
Illinois, 781 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
177 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the ways that procedural rules shift in response to the 
exigencies of the election cycle, which facilitates the resolution of claims before they 
become moot); supra text accompanying note 143-144 (discussing flexibility in claim 
selection); supra notes 67-72, 185 and accompanying text (discussing scope of remedy). 
178 Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
1105, 1108 (2010). 
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“embedded” doctrinally within what appears to be an individual 
lawsuit.179 
As Professor Nagareda defines the phenomenon, “[a] situation of embedded 
aggregation arises whenever any of [the three doctrinal features identified 
above] extends beyond the plaintiff in an individual lawsuit.”180 In redistricting 
litigation – a form of litigation that Professor Nagareda does not address, 
despite its aggregative features – all three of these doctrinal features extend 
well beyond the individual plaintiff. 
The first feature concerns the scope of the right of action asserted. An 
example is the Freedom of Information Act, “a federal statute that confers an 
undifferentiated right upon ‘any person’ to request the disclosure of ‘records’ 
held by the federal government” and therefore that has a “universe of potential 
claimants . . . without legal limits.”181 In redistricting cases, the scope of the 
right of action likewise has an “extraordinary breadth.”182 As discussed above, 
for example, it is routine for millions of voters to have undifferentiated equal 
representation claims.183 And once the possibility of litigant proxies is taken 
into account, the universe of potential claimants, at least as a practical matter, 
is similarly without legal limits. 
The second feature identified by Professor Nagareda addresses the “remedy 
the plaintiff seeks,” with the “important distinction concern[ing] the divisibility 
 
179 Id. at 1105-09. Whether redistricting litigation satisfies the definition of embedded 
aggregation provided by Professor Nagareda turns on whether redistricting-related demands 
to bind non-parties are coterminous with what his Article refers to as “ordinary stare 
decisis.” Certainly there have been, in the redistricting context, demands to bind non-parties 
outside the context of stare decisis. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529, 1557 
(N.D. Fla. 1995) (identifying the defendant’s argument that “plaintiffs are collaterally 
estopped from bringing this suit because they could have intervened in, and prosecuted their 
claims in, the earlier case,” but rejecting this argument in light of intervening changes in the 
law and factual circumstances). It nevertheless remains true that redistricting-related 
precedents become binding on non-parties primarily through the operation of stare decisis. 
Still, the application of this doctrine in the context of redistricting has sweeping effects 
across entire populations, and there are, as a practical matter, other ways in which non-
litigants are bound: once an election takes place pursuant to a particular court order, for 
example, it cannot be undone even by a successful subsequent redistricting-related 
challenge. In any event, whether this all constitutes the “ordinary stare decisis effect” for 
purposes of defining embedded aggregation seems less important than recognizing that, in 
the redistricting context, non-parties are predictably and profoundly affected by party 
activity. Indeed, as Professor Nagareda himself acknowledges, while his primary concerns 
extend beyond the “routine operation” of the stare decisis doctrine, his discussions do “not 
turn on any absolute, categorical separation between embedded aggregation and stare 
decisis.” Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1116 n.39. 
180 Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1112. 
181 Id. at 1109. 
182 Id. at 1117 (discussing the scope of the right under the Freedom of Information Act). 
183 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
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of the remedy – whether it is such that the court could, as a practical matter, 
afford it to the plaintiff at hand without affecting the application or availability 
of the same remedy to other persons who are nonparties to the plaintiff’s 
lawsuit.”184 Redistricting litigation again provides a robust illustration of this 
feature, as the remedies in redistricting litigation are both sweeping and 
indivisible. Indeed, it is standard practice for a court hearing a successful equal 
representation challenge to redraw the entire map, not simply the districts in 
which the plaintiffs are residing.185 Indeed, as a purely logistical matter, it may 
be impossible to redraw one district line without affecting many others. In any 
event, come election time, there can be only one map governing the 
proceedings. 
The final feature relates to “the nature of the underlying wrong that a civil 
lawsuit alleges,” where “the important question is whether the wrong is of such 
a nature as to affect a multitude of persons.”186 Once again, redistricting 
provides a clear example of the phenomenon. The underlying wrong – the 
failure of the primary redistricting agents to redistrict pursuant to law – affects, 
at a minimum, every voter within the relevant district. 
In short, redistricting litigation tends to affect non-parties in ways that, in 
certain important respects, track class actions and other forms of aggregative 
litigation, embedded or otherwise – and therefore that would seem to make it a 
leading candidate for class-action-type protections. But it does not trigger these 
protections. The uncomfortable tension becomes stark when litigants 
occasionally do choose to bring redistricting claims as class actions,187 and, 
even more tellingly, when they include allegations relating to class-action 
requirements, such as typicality and adequacy, but fail actually to seek class-
action certification.188 The latter form of pleading serves no legal purpose. It 
instead reveals litigants’ anxiety over the nature of redistricting litigation. 
The anxiety is appropriate. Tellingly, of the three examples identified in 
Professor Nagareda’s explication of embedded aggregation, only two have 
been subjected to court review, and in both cases the Supreme Court refused to 
sanction the relevant practice. Citing concerns over fairness and due process, 
 
184 Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1118. 
185 Recently in New York, for example, a federal court hearing challenges related to the 
2010 cycle redrew districts across the state even though the plaintiffs and interveners in the 
case resided in fewer than a dozen of the state’s sixty-two counties. Only one challenger, a 
resident of Tompkins County, resided outside the southeast part of the state, and none 
resided in Western New York, the North Country, or the Adirondacks. See Opinion and 
Order, Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-CV-5632, 2012 WL 928223 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012). 
Various filings submitted in the litigation by the over thirty plaintiffs and interveners 
include information about the residence of each. These filings are available at https://www.n 
yed.uscourts.gov/11-5632.cfm and are on file with the author. 
186 Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1120. 
187 See supra note 176. 
188 See Complaint at 6, Hippert v. Ritchie, No. 11-cv-00093 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 21, 
2011); Complaint at 2, Britton v. Ritchie, No. 11-cv-00093 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 12, 2011). 
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the Court “ultimately limit[ed] what an individual lawsuit may do out of 
concern that the lawsuit would otherwise operate as a de facto class action.”189 
In other words, the Court pushed back on courts seeking to permit forms of 
embedded aggregation. By contrast, in the Supreme Court’s most recent forays 
into redistricting, nowhere were questions of aggregation and representation 
even raised.190 
In short, redistricting litigation not only fails to protect the interests of non-
parties; it does so in a way that, in other contexts, has triggered calls for serious 
procedural protections. For non-litigant voters, therefore, there continue to be 
no formal protections as redistricting litigation unfolds. And, as discussed 
above, there is little reason to think all interests are being adequately 
represented in the cases at bar. The upshot is a particular form of litigation – 
not a conventional one-on-one lawsuit, not a class action – that accords great 
power to those who elect to litigate. 
3. Election Exigencies and Procedural Oddities 
A final defining feature of redistricting litigation is its dramatic procedural 
response to the exigencies of the election cycle. In the redistricting context, the 
pressures of timing have produced a shifting regime of legal standards, one that 
creates an unusual compression of civil procedure. Litigants aware of such 
shifts in procedure can employ various techniques to affect the likelihood of 
triggering this alternative legal regime. Combined with the other distinctive 
features of redistricting litigation, these procedural oddities make redistricting 
litigation even more conducive to manipulation by litigants. 
At its core, the shifting regime of legal standards relates to timing. Timing is 
critical in the redistricting context; it is hardly an exaggeration to state that 
“election-related dates drive redistricting litigation.”191 The election cycle 
renders deadlines in redistricting litigation notoriously tight, with redistricting 
courts routinely required to adjudicate complicated and fact-intensive 
challenges under “severe time constraints.”192 These pressures exist in part 
because elections cannot be put indefinitely on hold.193 The intense time 
 
189 Nagareda, supra note 178, at 1121 (discussing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 
(2008), and Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007)). 
190 Tennant v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 3 (2012); Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 
934 (2012). 
191 BRUCE M. CLARKE & ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REDISTRICTING 
LITIGATION: AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL, STATISTICAL, AND CASE-MANAGEMENT ISSUES 65 
(2002); see also Persily, supra note 93, at 1146-47 (describing the “series of frenzied 
twenty-four-hour days that often precede a court-drawn plan”). 
192 Supplemental Opinion at 10, Perry v. Perez, No. 11-CA-360, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
155601 (Dec. 2, 2011), overruled on other grounds by Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012); 
see also, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). 
193 This is true even though courts do have a limited ability to delay certain elections. 
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Monterey Cnty., 808 F. Supp. 727, 733 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (delaying 
special election to permit primary redistricting agents time to “consider the competing 
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pressures associated with the election cycle also alter the ways in which courts 
adjudicate cases. At a certain point, time constraints require an expediting of 
the proceedings – even if it means changing important procedural rules. It is in 
this context that the importance of timing becomes unmistakable. 
To ensure that district lines, even temporary ones, are in place for each 
election, the procedural rules governing redistricting lawsuits temporarily 
change in response to time constraints. They do so by shifting power among 
redistricting agents, by altering the standards for relief, and by affecting the 
timing of relief. 
The most drastic changes resulting from time pressure concern the balance 
of power among agents drawing electoral lines. A sufficient delay in state-
court proceedings, for example, shifts power away from state courts. This is a 
result of the so-called Growe doctrine, which normally requires that federal 
courts defer from ruling on certain redistricting claims if litigation is still 
pending in state court.194 This rule is important for a host of reasons; among 
other things, it dictates which set of judges, federal or state, will be 
adjudicating the relevant case. This limitation on the federal courts evaporates, 
however, if it appears the state court will not reach a timely ruling.195 In other 
words, sufficient delay permits – indeed, requires – a federal court that 
otherwise would stay its proceedings to engage in judicial redistricting. Those 
dissatisfied with state-court proceedings can benefit profoundly from the shift 
in forum.196 
There is an analogous shift in power away from state legislatures. As 
elections draw nearer, the ability, willingness, and obligation of courts to defer 
to primary redistricting agents all decrease. Normally, if a court concludes that 
a legislatively enacted map suffers from some legal flaw, it must provide the 
legislature time to remedy that map before it will implement a court-drawn 
version.197 If, however, the court concludes that, in light of election-related 
deadlines, there is not enough time for the legislature to act, it will bypass this 
step and directly implement a court-drawn map.198 The California Supreme 
Court’s description of its predicament after the 1980 redistricting cycle is 
illustrative: 
 
interests in [the] case”). 
194 Growe, 507 U.S. at 37. 
195 Id. at 36 (“[The District Court] of course . . . would have been justified in adopting its 
own plan if it had been apparent that the state court . . . would not develop a redistricting 
plan in time for the primaries.”); see also, e.g., Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. 
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (2005). 
196 Indeed, Growe itself demonstrated the outcome-determinative effects that this shift in 
forum can have on an electoral map. 507 U.S. at 28-31 (describing different results reached 
by state and federal courts adjudicating redistricting challenges that, in relevant part, were 
identical). 
197 See, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 261-62 (2003). 
198 Id. at 265; see also Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d. 529, 536 (S.D. Miss. 2002). 
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The options available to the court are limited. Were time constraints 
less pressing, the court might consider requesting the Legislature to 
develop an interim plan. However, the June primary is less than five 
months away. . . . [N]o new districts could be put into effect in time to 
inform the electorate and the candidates of their districts before the 
primary election.199 
Those challenging the work of primary redistricting agents can, through this 
changed approach, profit from delay. 
Finally, time pressures can shift power away from appellate courts, thereby 
increasing the power of trial courts in a manner that magnifies the effect of 
forum selection. Normally, a trial court judgment addressing a matter as 
inexorably intertwined with the public interest as redistricting would be a 
logical candidate for a stay pending appellate review.200 When elections are 
imminent, however, there may not be enough time for such protections, and, 
when that occurs, trial court redistricting decisions are generally the ones that 
control. It is as a result of this reality that the Supreme Court has expressly 
acknowledged the “improbability of completing judicial review before the 
necessary deadline for a new redistricting scheme.”201 Litigants preferring the 
composition of a particular trial court bench to the appellate court bench – a 
reasonable distinction, particularly where judiciaries appear politicized – 
therefore benefit from dragging their heels. 
A second category of timing-related transformations relates to the standards 
for relief. The Supreme Court recently concluded that when elections are 
sufficiently close in time and a legislatively enacted redistricting plan faces 
challenges under the Constitution or section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the 
district court is both empowered and required to redraw the map in a manner 
that responds to those challenges if the plaintiffs have shown a mere 
“likelihood of success on the merits.”202 While this is a “familiar standard,”203 
one normally applicable when plaintiffs are seeking a preliminary 
 
199 Assembly of the State v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 951 (Cal. 1982). The posture of 
this case was unusual, and it resulted, in effect, in a court-drawn plan that was identical to a 
legislatively enacted plan. Id. at 961. The court’s discussion nevertheless provides helpful 
insight into the effects of time pressures. 
200 See, e.g., Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (identifying the four factors 
governing the grant of a stay pending appeal as “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a 
strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure 
the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
201 Growe, 507 U.S. at 35.  
202 Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 942 (2012) (“Where a State’s plan faces challenges 
under the Constitution or § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a district court should still be guided 
by that plan, except to the extent those legal challenges are shown to have a likelihood of 
success on the merits.”). 
203 Id. 
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injunction,204 its familiarity does not detract from the fact that the standards for 
relief have shifted as a result of time pressures. The shift becomes even starker 
in the context of certain types of challenges related to section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, an unusual provision that, among other things, shifts the burden to 
the state to prove the validity of a district map.205 Under certain circumstances 
related to the timing of an approaching election, the standard for challenges 
related to section 5 is not one of success on the merits, or even likelihood of 
success on the merits, but rather one of “reasonable probability.”206 In short, 
the standards for proving violations, and therefore for replacing legislatively 
drawn lines with judicially drawn lines, change as an election draws nearer. 
A final effect of time pressure relates to what one court has referred to as 
“the timing of relief.”207 If a court concludes that, on account of time pressures, 
it would not be practicable for a jurisdiction to implement certain legally 
required changes prior to an election, the court may be willing to postpone the 
implementation of some or all of those changes. A federal court in 
Pennsylvania recently relied on these principles, for example, when it refused 
to redraw district lines and ordered that the jurisdiction instead rely on maps 
drawn over ten years earlier.208 Although the older maps were clearly invalid in 
light of the equal representation doctrine,209 the court explained that there are 
“‘certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and 
a State’s election machinery is already in progress,’ in which a court may 
withhold the granting of relief, even if the existing apportionment scheme is 
found to be invalid.”210 Were the time pressure less severe, the requested relief 
– in this instance, an altered district map – almost certainly would have been 
available. 
In these three important respects – relating to the balance of power among 
redistricting agents, the standards for relief, and the timing of court-imposed 
remedies – the rules in redistricting litigation transform as an election draws 
 
204 Id. 
205 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
206 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 942. (“And by ‘reasonable probability’ this Court means in 
this context that the § 5 challenge is not insubstantial.”). This standard arose out of a 
procedurally complicated line of litigation that involved two sets of parallel federal 
proceedings and a court tasked with imposing an interim map without the benefit of recently 
pre-cleared district lines. The procedural complications presented in this case, while 
extensive, would not have necessitated a shift in the procedural rules had there been enough 
time for the courts to adjudicate the relevant claims. It is worth noting that this particular 
shift in the standards can assist defendants as well as plaintiffs. By relying on this standard, 
a jurisdiction defending its map may be able to circumvent (or, at least, delay) the full brunt 
of the section 5 preclearance requirement. 
207 Pileggi v. Aichele, 843 F. Supp. 2d 584, 593 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 589. 
210 Id. at 593 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585). 
 2013] DELEGATION OF DEMOCRATIC DESIGN 607 
 
closer. These temporary changes have lasting effects: even if the rules 
eventually are restored and the maps eventually redrawn, interim maps govern 
interim elections. The elections held in North Carolina in the 1990s provide a 
vivid illustration of the consequences. In early 1992 plaintiffs filed a lawsuit 
challenging the state’s newly drawn congressional districts.211 Although the 
challenges ultimately were successful, it took over six years for the litigation to 
affect the congressional maps actually used in an election. In other words, a 
district plan later held to be unconstitutional governed North Carolina’s 
elections in 1992, 1994, and 1996, and for those constitutional violations there 
was no retroactive remedy to be had.212 
The temporary changes also are unusual. While it is true that the standards 
for any sort of court-ordered relief do change in response to certain timing 
pressures – as, for example, when a litigant pursues preliminary relief and must 
establish a mere likelihood of success on the merits – the multifaceted 
compression of civil procedure that occurs in the redistricting context is highly 
atypical. The scope of all the changes, the lasting effects of interim relief, and 
the predictability of the timing crunch combine to create a date-dependent legal 
regime that shifts in significant ways as an election draws nearer. 
The predictability matters, for these temporary changes are susceptible to 
manipulation by litigants. Litigants can speed up or slow down litigation by, 
among other things, filing (or declining to file) time-consuming motions, 
adjusting discovery demands, and carefully scheduling the filing of their 
claims. They also can simply ask: litigants routinely propose scheduling orders 
and petition courts for extensions or expedition of time.213 It is by employing 
these tools that redistricting litigants can work to trigger shifts in the legal 
 
211 Daniel P. Tokaji, Representation & Raceblindness: The Story of Shaw v. Reno, in 
RACE LAW STORIES 513, 516 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008); see also 
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901-02 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655-56 (1993). 
212 Tokaji, supra note 211, at 532. It was not until 1998 – and not until the case had made 
two trips to the Supreme Court – that an election was held pursuant to a plan altered in 
response to the legal challenge. Id. at 516-35. Even this was not the end of the litigation. 
Related challenges went back to the Supreme Court another two times before the start of the 
next cycle (that is, before the 2000 census data was released). See id. at 534 (“For the fourth 
time in eight years of litigation over North Carolina’s congressional districts, the Supreme 
Court had reversed the three-judge district court.”). 
213 See, e.g., Letter to the Court, Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-Civ.-5632 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 
2011), available at https://ecf.nyed.uscourts.gov/dropbox/324457/1.11.cv.5632.6528965.0.p 
df (requesting extension of time); Joint Advisory to the Court Regarding Submission of 
Proposed Interim Court Ordered Plans, Davis v. Perry, No. 5:11-cv-00360, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 
Oct. 28, 2011), available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxeOfQQnUr_gZDYyNDFjYm 
YtM2Y1Zi00OTJhLWI1MGItYjY0MmM3YzQ4MzZh/edit (setting forth parties’ proposed 
lengths of time and dates for hearings); see also Order, Perry, No. 5:11-cv-00360 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 8, 2011), available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxeOfQQnUr_gMjk2Nzkz 
ZjItNWI3Ni00YmQ0LTkzMjItYjYzNzM0NTAzYmNi/edit?pli=1 (requesting from the 
parties briefing on whether a trial should proceed or be delayed). 
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standards and take advantage of the procedural oddities characterizing 
redistricting litigation.214 
It is therefore not surprising to find examples of redistricting litigants trying 
to manipulate timing – or at least accusing each other of the same. The parties 
before the Supreme Court in the redistricting case that recently came out of 
Texas, for example, all pointed fingers at one another with respect to the 
perceived delay: lawyers for the state accused others of delaying proceedings 
through “interventions and discovery opposed by the State of Texas,”215 while 
lawyers for other parties accused Texas of causing delay through “dilatory 
litigation choices,” such as “insist[ing] on pursuing summary judgment” and 
refusing to agree to a “quick trial date.”216 Even the district court judges 
acknowledged the control over timing exercised by these litigants,217 and theirs 
is far from the only judicial commentary on the subject. Judges occasionally 
criticize redistricting litigants for perceived delay tactics,218 and on somewhat 
rarer occasion compliment parties for their efforts in streamlining litigation.219 
 
214 It is true that there are limitations on what litigants can control. These limitations may 
be practical, strategic, a byproduct of the adversarial method, or a result of courts’ case-
management tools. See, e.g., CLARKE & REAGAN, supra note 191, at 65-71. Litigants 
nevertheless retain significant influence over the timing of litigation. 
215 Emergency Application for Stay of Interlocutory Order Directing Implementation of 
Interim Texas House of Representatives Redistricting Plan Pending Appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court at 4, Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (No. 11A536); see also 
Abbott Accuses DOJ of Stalling; DOJ Fires Back, TEX. REDISTRICTING & ELECTION L. (Dec. 
1, 2011, 9:59 PM), http://txredistricting.org/post/13621218808/abbott-accuses-doj-of-stallin 
g-doj-fires-back. 
216 Joint Response of Rodriguez Respondents et al. in Opposition to Texas’s Emergency 
Application for Stay & Injunction at 4, 24, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 934 (No. 11A536). 
217 See Respondents Texas Latino Redistricting Task Force et al. Joint Brief in 
Opposition to Emergency Application for Stay of Interlocutory Order Directing 
Implementation of Interim Congressional Redistricting Plan Pending Appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 934 (No. 11A536) (quoting the district court in a 
related case as stating, with respect to scheduling issues, that “‘at the moment it’s Texas’ 
lawsuit and Texas’ motion for summary judgment, and that’s what we’re scheduling’” 
(quoting Transcript of Telephonic Conference at 33-34, Texas v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-
01303 (D.D.C 2012)). Later, in the original case, the three-judge panel issued an order 
emphasizing the need for the parties to cooperate to get a timely map in place: “It is the 
Court’s desire to have redistricting plans in place for an April primary and all parties must 
continue their negotiations to assist the Court in accomplishing that task.” Order, Perez v. 
Texas, 2012 WL 4094933 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (No. 11-CA-360). 
218 See, e.g., Baldus v. Members of the Wisconsin Gov’t Accountability Bd., 843 F. 
Supp. 2d 955, 960 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (referring to the “the sandbagging, hide-the-ball trial 
tactics that continue to be employed” and asserting that “[n]either this Court, the parties in 
the case, nor Wisconsin’s citizens have the interest or time to endure the litigation tactics 
being used by public officials or their private counsel”); cf. Badham v. U.S. Dist. Court, 721 
F.2d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Defendants argue that the Republicans themselves have 
been guilty of delay and have not pursued diligently their claims in state court. They 
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The commentary by these judges provides further support for the conclusion 
that litigants tend to have significant control over the timing of litigation. 
Particularly in the redistricting context, where time pressures change the rules 
that govern redistricting litigation, this control over timing can serve as a 
powerful strategic tool. These changes in the rules unquestionably affect the 
process and have the potential to affect the lines themselves. 
In short, a defining feature of redistricting litigation is the unusual 
compression of civil procedure that begins as an election approaches and that 
encourages procedural manipulation. This attribute, coupled with the regime’s 
accommodation of litigants and its neglect of nonparties, together make the 
larger point: litigating as redistricting – far from being the purely court-
dominated practice that the literature would suggest – is highly susceptible to 
litigant control. This, in turn, makes for a remarkable form of redistricting. 
B. A Curious Form of Redistricting 
Redistricting litigants, as explained above, benefit from a significant 
delegation of authority by a system that relies on them as critical agents of 
fallback redistricting. This, in turn, produces a form of redistricting that is 
remarkable in at least three fundamental respects. Namely, the regime relies on 
actors who are not representative of the general electorate; it grants them a 
staggering amount of power; and it requires that these actors exercise their 
power through opaque and indirect means. 
Litigating is a remarkable form of redistricting, perhaps most significantly, 
because of its reliance on a group of actors that is in no sense representative of 
the electorate as a whole. In the context of redistricting, this is unusual. Other 
redistricting agents – members of state legislatures, commission members, and 
even judges – are in some sense representative of the communities they serve; 
each has either been elected or appointed by those who have been elected. Not 
so with redistricting litigants. Quite to the contrary, the composition of this 
group is defined by the particular collection of traits identified above,220 and as 
such, the litigants behind any given lawsuit are unlikely to be representative of 
the electorate. Rather, they are, in all likelihood, representative of major 
political parties, prominent interest groups, and others with significant 
financial backing and the most directly at stake. The result is a reliance on 
actors who, at best, lack incentives to represent broad interests and who tend to 
 
contend further that absent such delaying tactics, the Republicans would have already had a 
swift resolution of their state law claims in state court. The argument is premature.”). 
219 Navajo Nation v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1016 
n.23 (D. Ariz. 2002) (“The Court commends the attorneys and parties for working 
diligently, cooperatively, and with ingenuity to narrow the issues regarding the DOJ’s 
objections and for compromising on an interim plan for the 2002 elections. What was 
initially anticipated to be lengthy litigation was significantly diminished by [various actions 
taken by the litigants and in particular the DOJ].”). 
220 See supra Part I.A. 
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favor certain results. It is no coincidence, for example, that redistricting 
litigants sometimes are able to reach a “political compromise” that “partition[s] 
the state so as to lock in the political status quo ante.”221 Moreover, those likely 
to benefit the most from this form of redistricting are, ironically enough, those 
who failed to achieve majority rule in the relevant jurisdiction. As Professor 
Cain has explained, it is predictably the losers who initiate litigation: 
In particular, redistricting is bedeviled by the sore loser problem: because 
new district lines can determine the electoral fates of candidates, political 
parties, and interest groups, it is usually worth their time and effort to 
overturn a plan that they do not like for the uncertain prospect of 
something better.222 
The composition of this non-representative group helps to explain the concern 
– voiced periodically by the few who have acknowledged the role litigants 
might play in redistricting – that redistricting litigation may be subject to 
“partisan capture.”223 
The effects of this lack of representativeness are then compounded, in this 
strange form of redistricting, by a systemic failure to protect non-litigants. As 
discussed above, though entire electorates are affected in a profound way by 
the actions of the redistricting litigants, no formal mechanism ensures their 
interests will be taken into account. While the opaque nature of the 
redistricting litigants makes it difficult to identify exactly whose interests are 
being ignored, perhaps the most obvious target are those who would benefit 
from a “competitive electoral process.”224 Litigants often have an incentive to 
reach mutually beneficial compromises – either explicitly, through settlement, 
or implicitly, through a bilateral decision not to bring certain claims – that 
favor the political status quo. Such a result is particularly troubling to those 
“commit[ted] to the competitive integrity of the political process as an 
indispensable guarantor of democratic constitutionalism.”225 
It is true that the involvement of the courts, which are both more 
representative and more transparent than are litigants, helps to counteract the 
power exercised by the latter group. But it far from erases it. Particularly when 
litigants exercise so much control over the courts themselves, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that significant redistricting power has been delegated in 
a manner that fails to protect all affected parties. 
This underscores another reason why litigating is a remarkable form of 
redistricting: namely, redistricting litigants are given a staggering amount of 
power. The various powers exercised by redistricting litigants throughout the 
 
221 Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 598, 600 (discussing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 
(1973), which the author sharply criticizes as “insult[ing] [] the competitiveness of the 
process resulting from the ability of insiders to lessen competitive pressures”). 
222 Cain, supra note 2, at 1836. 
223 See Cox, supra note 89, at 800; Karlan, supra note 63, at 1733. 
224 Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 615. 
225 Id. (describing the “political markets” approach). 
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life of a lawsuit – and even before, through the threat of litigation, and after, 
through the precedential effects of a decision – combine to create a regime in 
which the participation of litigants, taken in sum, plays a profoundly 
consequential role in redistricting. Certain manifestations of their influence (as 
illustrated, for example, through the mechanisms of forum selection, claim 
selection, and manipulation of timing)226 confirm the reach of this power. 
It nevertheless does remain difficult to determine precisely the degree of 
influence that a litigant has over a case. This uncertainty, in turn, relates to a 
third remarkable quality of litigating as redistricting. The power litigants 
exercise often must be employed through opaque and indirect means. Forum 
selection is one example of this phenomenon. Another example is the ability 
litigants have to manipulate timing and thereby to trigger the shift in rules that 
depends on timing. These complicated legal mechanisms are both difficult to 
measure and hard to explain to a layperson, thereby compounding the 
transparency problems already affecting this form of redistricting. The indirect 
nature of these processes also ensures that the results will not always be what 
are intended. If nothing else, the divide between the desired outcomes and the 
means employed adds a significant degree of randomness into the process. 
In short, litigating presents a strange model for redistricting. It delegates 
significant authority to a non-representative group of actors, and it requires that 
they employ their power in ways that are opaque and indirect. It is a form of 
redistricting that leads to serious normative concerns. 
III. A TROUBLING DELEGATION 
The delegation of authority to redistricting litigants, described in detail 
above, is complicated and consequential. It is also deeply troubling. Its more 
problematic qualities threaten to undermine the quality of the outcomes, 
efficiency, and legitimacy of the redistricting process. Combined, these 
concerns suggest a regime in need of examination and, quite possibly, reform. 
This Part, which explores the normative implications of litigant participation in 
the redistricting process, concludes with a discussion of reforms that, if 
adopted, may help to achieve a more sensible delegation of democratic design. 
A. The Normative Implications of Litigant Participation 
The participation of litigants threatens to jeopardize several fundamental 
aspects of the redistricting process, including the quality of its outcomes. As 
discussed above, the delegation of authority to litigants permits these actors, to 
a significant though somewhat unpredictable extent, to control the district lines 
that ultimately govern elections. Litigants exercise this control through 
techniques as broad as refusing to bring challenges that do not advance their 
interests, and as subtle as delaying litigation in the hopes of triggering a more 
favorable set of rules. Does this influence tend to produce better redistricting 
 
226 See supra Part II.A. 
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outcomes? To answer this question in full, one must engage in the difficult, or 
perhaps impossible, project of determining a normative baseline for 
redistricting maps. Yet even taking litigant redistricting on its own terms 
indicates cause for concern. Litigants’ power to redistrict stems from their 
ability to enforce constitutional and statutory rules.227 As a result, to defend 
litigant participation in redistricting, one might argue that litigant participation 
improves redistricting outcomes by making the outcomes more consistent with 
governing legal standards. 
Surely this occurs to some extent. There is, in other words, a persuasive 
argument to be made that the participation of litigants tends to produce maps 
that are at least somewhat more consistent with the relevant legal standards 
than are maps produced in their absence. The approach nevertheless has a 
number of potential defects in the manner in which litigants work toward this 
end. At the outset, there is little reason to believe that litigants’ interests 
necessarily align with those of the electorate at large. As such, there is little 
reason to believe that litigants will make decisions likely to produce the maps 
most consistent with the governing legal standards, rather than most likely to 
achieve their preferred outcomes. Forum, for example, is selected not to secure 
the most competent judge, but rather the most favorable; claims are selected 
not in response to a neutral assessment of the merits, but rather in light of the 
practical needs of clients. With respect to matters of timing, such concerns 
grow even more acute: timing-related mechanisms have the potential to 
undermine, rather than promote, the enforcement of legal norms through 
reliance on interim maps, abbreviated appellate review, and relaxed legal 
standards governing relief. These examples are merely illustrative. Throughout 
the redistricting process, litigants rely on tools that, at best, do not fit perfectly 
the ends they may be meant to accomplish and, at worst, are subversive. To the 
extent redistricting litigation is characterized by these more negative qualities – 
a lack of representativeness, subjectivity to procedural manipulation, and a 
certain degree of randomness – it is difficult to conclude that this approach is 
likely to produce the most normatively desirable maps. 
Many of these considerations also lead to a second normative concern, 
relating to efficiency. By relying so heavily on litigants (particularly where 
litigation is the only form of fallback redistricting), jurisdictions force 
redistricting to proceed through the mechanisms of civil litigation, which is 
many things, but rarely efficient.228 To the contrary, litigation is notoriously 
 
227 Indeed, it is not obvious how these rules would be enforced in their absence. Even 
when scholars debate how best to enforce these standards, the discussions normally concern 
the type of challenges litigants should bring, not whether litigants should participate at all. 
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker 
v. Carr and its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1418 (2002); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra 
note 107, at 2292; Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and 
Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 103 (2000). 
228 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823 (1985) (arguing that the American system of civil litigation is inefficient as 
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cumbersome, time consuming, and resource-draining. Moreover, many of 
these problems may be exacerbated in the context of redistricting litigation, 
which implicates factual and legal issues of great complexity, allows 
participation by anyone with sufficient resources and adequate motivation to 
drive the proceedings, and creates incentives for litigants to manipulate the 
system in potentially subversive ways. From an efficiency standpoint, 
redistricting through litigation appears far from ideal. 
Finally, litigant influence has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of 
the redistricting process.229 Litigation is a combative process that can 
encourage negative characterizations and hostile rhetoric. Moreover, litigants’ 
reliance on what are perceived as “litigation tactics” – including manipulation 
of timing and the other mechanisms discussed above – seems likely to strike 
many observers as profoundly unfair. What is perhaps most troubling is that 
most redistricting litigants are self-selected. As discussed above, no official 
authority – not the electorate, not an elected political body, and not the courts – 
has selected these actors to participate in the process, much less asked them to 
represent any interest other than their own. To the contrary, these litigants 
became redistricting agents on their own initiative – generally because they 
were unable to achieve their ends through the politically accountable branches 
– and they are not in any sense expected to advance others’ interests. And in 
many cases, it is not even clear who may be funding or otherwise controlling a 
litigant’s participation.230 
It is true that certain aspects of redistricting litigation have at least the 
potential to increase legitimacy. Litigants are constrained by rules and 
doctrines; much of their work is introduced into the public record; and the 
adversarial system helps to check their assertions and their arguments. 
Redistricting litigants nevertheless remain, for the most part, self-appointed, 
self-interested, and driven by motives and interests that are not transparent – all 
while pursuing their ends through opaque and potentially subversive means. 
Delegating significant authority to these actors at least threatens to undermine 
the legitimacy of the redistricting process. 
In sum, normative concerns emerge from the participation of litigants in the 
redistricting process or, at least, from certain qualities of their participation. 
The most problematic qualities might be summarized as, first, the failure to 
achieve a representative body among the litigants, and, second, the ability 
litigants have to manipulate proceedings through procedure. The power of 
procedural manipulation both allows litigants to exercise control over the 
agents meant to mediate their participation (that is, the courts) and widens the 
 
compared to the German system). 
229 As discussed above, legitimacy in this context may reflect different meanings. See 
supra note 25. This Article, rather than seeking to resolve these difficult questions of 
legitimacy as they relate to the participation of litigants in the redistricting process, instead 
seeks to initiate the discussion. 
230 See supra text accompanying note 33. 
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divide between what litigants do (such as select forum) and what they seek to 
achieve (in the end, to influence district lines). This collection of concerns is 
serious. Yet just as there has been little analysis of redistricting litigants, there 
has been little analysis of the troubling implications. As a result, there have 
been, thus far, few calls for reform targeting the role that litigants play in 
redistricting. 
B. Toward a More Thoughtful Delegation of Democratic Design 
To address the concerns associated with redistricting litigants, it is first 
necessary to acknowledge the pivotal role they play, a project this Article seeks 
to inaugurate. The normative concerns emerging from such analysis in turn 
reveal that those interested in reform might seek to pursue two main goals: 
improved representativeness and reduced opportunities for procedural 
manipulation by litigants. Pursuit of these dual goals should help to address 
some of the most problematic qualities of litigant participation. 
For jurisdictions seeking to implement reforms within the existing 
adjudicative framework,231 there are two broad approaches that might be taken. 
First, jurisdictions might seek to reform existing fallback redistricting regimes 
by limiting the involvement of courts, thereby reducing the involvement of 
litigants. Second, jurisdictions might regulate the ways in which litigants 
participate in civil litigation. This Section provides an outline of each 
approach. Although neither approach would address all normative concerns 
raised by the role of litigants in the redistricting process, a sensible 
combination of the two may be an important step in that direction. 
1. Reducing Reliance on Litigants 
The first approach to litigant participation seeks to limit the involvement of 
litigants by limiting the involvement of courts. This relatively blunt tool 
pursues the relevant goals – representativeness and reduced manipulation – by 
closing off the forum in which litigants exercise the most power. The most 
drastic manifestation of this approach would involve a complete overruling of 
the precedents that have recognized redistricting as a justiciable issue. Were 
federal and state courts simply to refuse to adjudicate redistricting challenges 
(citing, for example, the political question doctrine or something similar), those 
decisions effectively would eliminate litigant involvement in the process. 
 
231 One might argue that the pathologies of litigant participation in redistricting are so 
great that they justify a complete rejection of the American-style system of adjudication. If 
so, other adjudicative models – such as those characteristic of the German model – may be 
more appropriate in this context. Cf. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral 
Exceptionalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (criticizing the model for 
redistricting adopted in the United States as unusually dependent on judicialization). See 
generally Langbein, supra note 228. Such analysis lies beyond the scope of this Article, 
which takes as a given “[o]ur lawyer-dominated system of civil procedure.” Id. at 823. 
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Half a century after the United States Supreme Court first opened its doors 
to redistricting litigants in Baker v. Carr232 – a decision that Chief Justice Earl 
Warren would later call “the most important case of my tenure”233 – it seems 
unrealistic to think that courts across the country would change direction so 
dramatically. In addition, it also seems difficult to justify such a change as an 
appropriate response to the problems associated with litigant participation. 
While it is true that removing courts from the process would effectively 
eliminate litigant influence, it also would entirely eliminate the backstop 
provided by litigant-based fallback redistricting. In the absence of some 
replacement, the result would be a regime whereby primary redistricting 
litigants would be able to draw electoral lines in legally indefensible ways – for 
example, with the express intent of eliminating the ability of historically 
disadvantaged racial groups to elect candidates of their choice – with no fear 
that courts would mandate revisions. This response is unsatisfying on multiple 
grounds. It addresses the lack of representativeness by ensuring that no one is 
represented as a litigant, and it takes a hammer to the problem of procedural 
manipulation when, as discussed below, more delicate tools may be available. 
In short, a refusal by courts even to entertain redistricting challenges would be 
too drastic a response to the particular problems associated with litigant 
influence in redistricting. 
Two alternative reforms are more measured, and therefore may be more 
appropriate. First, when weighing the benefits of creating or recognizing 
certain causes of action, those responsible – courts, legislators, or electorates – 
might break from current practice and acknowledge the role litigants play in 
enforcing these claims. This, in turn, would encourage those in charge to take 
into account the costs associated with such reliance. Particularly when a cause 
of action is especially vulnerable to partisan capture or otherwise proves 
particularly problematic in the context of litigant enforcement, such 
considerations may counsel against the adoption of a claim that necessarily 
will be administered through the courts. 
Second, jurisdictions that have not already done so might consider designing 
and empowering alternative fallback redistricting regimes. Stated otherwise, 
jurisdictions could design the process so that litigants and courts are no longer 
the exclusive agents of fallback redistricting. A minority of jurisdictions 
already have adopted such reforms. As discussed above, for example, the 
Illinois state constitution initially empowers the legislature to draw certain 
districts following the census.234 If the legislature has failed to enact a plan by 
a given date, however, the constitution shifts power to a Legislative 
Redistricting Commission, whose members are selected by elected officials.235 
 
232 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
233 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977). 
234 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b). 
235 Id. 
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By empowering alternative fallback redistricting agents of this sort, 
jurisdictions address a problem that occurs with regularity (and generally as a 
result of legislative gridlock): the failure of primary redistricting agents to 
redistrict in accordance with the decennial mandate. In the 2010 cycle, for 
example, this failure affected at least eight states and nearly two dozen 
electoral maps.236 When such a situation arises, well-established Supreme 
Court precedent makes clear that the preexisting maps are unconstitutional and 
cannot govern elections,237 and in jurisdictions where litigants and courts are 
the only agents empowered to engage in fallback redistricting, the task of 
redrawing the lines falls exclusively to them. Litigants in this circumstance 
exercise extraordinary influence, for the maps they target must be redrawn 
entirely by the courts. 
When this occurs, the first backstop need not be civil litigation. Rather, an 
attempt to remedy the problem initially could occur via a separate fallback 
institution, such as that in Illinois, that is more transparent and more 
representative. It is true that alternative fallback redistricting regimes have 
their own potential to undermine the process – for example, if the proceedings 
occur in secrecy or the members are corrupt – but careful structuring of these 
regimes helps to address such concerns.238 It is also true that instituting such 
regimes would not entirely remove litigant influence. The alternative 
redistricting agents also may fail to deliver a map, and even if they do, litigants 
still may sue. But by empowering an alternative set of redistricting agents, 
jurisdictions at least would minimize the chance of punting the entire 
redistricting project to the courts, and in this sense the jurisdictions could 
reduce their reliance on redistricting litigants with respect to one of the most 
problematic manifestations of the phenomenon. 
Both of these reforms represent more moderate attempts at reducing litigant 
participation. As such, they represent more a measured and targeted response 
to the problems potentially posed by litigant influence. 
2. Regulating Litigant Participation 
A second approach to reform seeks to regulate, rather than necessarily to 
reduce, litigant participation. Specific changes might help to advance both of 
the goals identified above: improving representativeness and reducing 
opportunities for procedural manipulation. Each is addressed in turn. 
To increase representativeness, jurisdictions might encourage a broader 
spectrum of individuals to participate in the litigation process. Although it 
would be impractical to expect throngs of new parties to file court appearances, 
participation by new actors very well may be realistic if jurisdictions were to 
permit and encourage courts to reach out to non-litigants. This has occurred, 
for example, in Minnesota, where the judges adjudicating redistricting 
 
236 Levitt, supra note 11. 
237 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
238 See generally Cain, supra note 2, at 1812. 
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challenges scheduled hearings throughout the state in an effort to hear from 
those not participating as litigants.239 The information gathered can be 
particularly influential with respect to certain critical legal issues – for 
example, with respect to so-called communities of interest, which is a term 
referring to “group[s] of people concentrated in a geographic area who share 
similar interests and priorities” and whose presence, or lack thereof, can affect 
the legality of electoral maps.240 The cost of participating in hearings of this 
sort is much lower than the cost of participating in litigation as a party. One 
would, as a result, expect greater participation. The approach, which helps to 
enhance the “voice” of non-parties,241 has much to commend it.242 
The term “voice,” in this context, is borrowed from class-action scholars,243 
and given the overlap between these forms of litigation, the connection is far 
from coincidental. Yet while it is tempting to try to import a series of class-
action-type protections into the redistricting context, it is difficult to imagine 
how this translation would occur. Many of the most well-established class-
action protections – which seek to ensure the numerosity of parties, the 
commonality of issues, the typicality of claims, and the adequacy of counsel244 
– are normally employed in a manner that assumes that the party in question 
wants to obtain class-action certification. Otherwise, there is no stick: the 
consequence of failing to meet the requirements is simply denial of 
certification. Yet as previously observed, redistricting lawsuits need not 
proceed as class actions, and most litigants have little incentive to pursue such 
an approach.245 Changing that rule – that is, reversing the rule that redistricting 
lawsuits need not proceed as class actions – poses its own set of logistical and 
constitutional problems, particularly in situations when the failure of any party 
to achieve class certification would result in the use of an outdated or 
otherwise clearly unlawful map. In short, the class-action model fails to 
provide an obvious framework for reform.246 
Rather than attempt to force class-action protections into the redistricting 
context, courts might seek to improve the representativeness of the process 
through more delicate means: namely, by relying more heavily on actors who 
 
239 Amended Order Setting Public Hearing Schedule at 2, Hippert v. Ritchie, No. A11-
152 (Minn. Spec. Redistricting Panel Sept. 13, 2011). 
240 LEVITT, CITIZEN’S GUIDE supra note 8, at 56. 
241 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 376 & n.17 (2000). 
242 For similar reforms proposed in other litigation contexts, see Brianne J. Gorod, The 
Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011). 
243 See Coffee, supra note 241, at 376. 
244 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
245 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
246 This may be less disappointing than it initially appears: scholars have expressed 
skepticism with respect to the efficacy of most class-action protections. See, e.g., Coffee, 
supra note 241, at 371-72. 
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are likely to represent a broader array of interests. Courts could, for example, 
employ special masters and court-appointed experts in efforts to counteract the 
biases and interests of the litigants.247 This approach has been used with 
apparent success in jurisdictions such as Connecticut and New York.248 Courts 
likewise could, as necessary, appoint counsel to advocate for potentially 
meritorious positions that have been neglected by the parties.249 Such steps 
would appear to constitute a measured response to the lack of 
representativeness affecting redistricting litigation.250 
To advance the second primary goal – reducing opportunities for procedural 
manipulation – jurisdictions could pursue targeted reforms. Forum selection 
provides a straightforward example. Granting litigants the ability to select 
forum – that is, to influence who will serve as the judicial mediator between 
them and the maps they seek to change – can reward procedural manipulation 
in powerful ways. To counteract this effect, those interested in reform could 
follow the lead of the minority of jurisdictions that already have enacted 
redistricting-specific venue rules.251 This straightforward fix significantly 
restricts the potential for forum-related manipulation. 
Litigants’ ability to set court agendas through claim selection, by contrast, 
poses a more challenging problem for the reform community. A potential 
reform nevertheless may be modeled on what this Article refers to as claim-
forcing statutes. Though these are rare, claim-forcing statutes are potentially 
effective counterweights where they apply. In Florida, for example, the state 
constitution requires, with respect to certain district maps, that the Attorney 
General petition the state supreme court “for a declaratory judgment 
determining the validity of the apportionment” within fifteen days of its 
passage.252 A narrower but more prominent example of a claim-forcing statute 
is section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires that certain jurisdictions 
obtain preclearance from the federal government prior to enforcing new district 
maps.253 With respect to the limited question of retrogression at issue in these 
section 5 proceedings, there is no escaping some form of federal review. 
 
247 See Gorod, supra note 242 (discussing similar reforms in other litigation contexts). 
248 See Order Directing Special Master, In re Petition of Reapportionment Commission, 
36 A.3d 661 (Conn. Jan. 3, 2012), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/SC1890 
7_010312.pdf; Persily, supra note 93, at 1148; Thomas Kaplan, Unmapped: Update on New 
York Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2012, at A21. 
249 Cf. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 273-74 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (Eisele, J., 
dissenting) (lamenting the failure of the parties to raise a particular claim). 
250 It is true that the justiciability doctrines, if applied aggressively, may pose a bar to 
increased court involvement. See, e.g., id. at 274 (“Even in public-interest lawsuits such as 
this [redistricting lawsuit], there are limits upon the Court’s authority to sua sponte, take up 
and deal with issues it sees in the case but which the parties choose to ignore.”). It may be 
appropriate to apply these doctrines liberally where necessary to effectuate such reforms. 
251 See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. 
252 FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c). 
253 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006); see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
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Although these sorts of requirements by no means remove litigant control, they 
do limit the ability of redistricting litigants to pick and choose which claims 
will be brought before the courts. 
At first blush, claim-forcing statutes may be thought simply to increase the 
influence of litigants by mandating that certain claims be adjudicated. Yet 
these requirements only make a difference with respect to claims that no party 
wants to raise, and, as a result, the statutes actually reduce the opportunity for 
procedural manipulation of the process. Litigants no longer serve as the only 
actors setting court agendas. 
Reducing the manipulation associated with timing poses yet another 
challenge. The difficulty is largely logistical: speed in redistricting is more 
easily demanded than achieved, particularly when primary redistricting agents 
fundamentally disagree on which approach to take (or which politicians to 
favor) in redrawing district lines. In an effort to respond to the compression of 
civil procedure that occurs in redistricting litigation – more precisely, to avoid 
the aspects of this regime that prove highly vulnerable to litigant manipulation 
– jurisdictions nevertheless might attempt, to the extent possible, to set 
deadlines for redistricting that permit adequate time for litigation prior to the 
start of the election cycle. To provide proper incentives, jurisdictions could 
strip primary redistricting agents of the power to redistrict if they miss 
deadlines. Fallback redistricting agents, in turn, might be required to begin 
their own work as quickly as possible – perhaps even engaging in preliminary 
map-drawing and legal argument before the deadlines have passed for the 
primary redistricting agents. 
This leads to a final, more general response to litigant influence, one that 
addresses the approach courts might take toward the “unwelcome obligation” 
of engaging in judicial redistricting.254 Stated succinctly, courts adjudicating 
redistricting cases should consider engaging in a particularly aggressive form 
of case management. Deference to litigant preferences – which seems less of a 
priority than it might otherwise be when a court is participating in the 
quintessentially public task of redistricting – might be reduced, with courts 
more willing to act sua sponte in determining how the case should be run.255 
To the extent this sort of regime would put courts in an unusual posture, 
redistricting litigation seems to present a case for unusual treatment. 
By embracing reforms of this sort, jurisdictions might help to minimize the 
control litigants have over courts, bridge the divide between what litigants do 
and what they seek to achieve, and otherwise counteract the potentially 
corrosive effects of procedural manipulation. 
In sum, there are a number of reforms potentially available to those seeking 
to improve the litigant-dependent systems of fallback redistricting. Some seek 
 
254 See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977). 
255 Tellingly, many with first-hand experience recommend that redistricting courts 
engage in aggressive case management. See, e.g., CLARKE & REAGAN, supra note 191, at 68-
71; Persily, supra note 93, at 1131, 1131-65. 
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to address the concerns raised by litigation participation by reducing it; others 
by regulating it. Jurisdictions should consider implementing a sensible 
combination of both. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been now half a century since the Supreme Court first transformed 
litigants into agents of redistricting. By creating a judicially based regime of 
fallback redistricting, Baker v. Carr and its progeny ensured that the process 
would depend on a diverse and largely self-selected group of participants to 
dictate many important aspects of redistricting. Litigants now affect whether, 
when, and how a given court will intervene. 
Despite the extensive scholarly attention paid to courts’ involvement in the 
redistricting process, litigants have not been recognized for what they are: 
important and distinct agents of redistricting, upon whom the process relies, 
who are capable of affecting redistricting in deliberate and potentially 
outcome-determinative ways. For all involved in the redistricting process, the 
dearth of analysis is a disservice, for the role of litigants must be understood 
and acknowledged if the redistricting process is to operate in an effective, 
transparent, and legitimate way. 
To this end, it is important to recognize that the reliance on litigant 
participation is not without consequences or costs. It produces a form of 
litigation highly susceptible to procedural manipulation, which in turn puts in 
place a form of redistricting controlled in fundamental ways by those who 
choose to litigate. This arrangement gives rise to normative concerns. In the 
absence of adequate regulation, litigant participation threatens to compromise 
the outcomes, efficiency, and legitimacy of the redistricting process. 
Targeted reforms, including those meant to reduce reliance on litigants and 
those regulating their participation, may help to alleviate these problems. 
In short, litigants are not bit players in the court-dominated supervision of 
elections, and they should not be treated as such. Quite to the contrary, litigants 
are powerful agents of redistricting, able to exercise control over the 
redistricting process and its outcomes, whose efforts are authorized and 
facilitated by the legal system itself. It therefore is critical to begin 
recognizing, analyzing, and better regulating this particular delegation of 
democratic design. 
 
